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Abstract
China has witnessed profound socioeconomic changes over the past four decades. This dissertation is
comprised of three papers that investigate the demographic, social, and economic determinants of
fertility trends in China. In Chapter 1, I discuss how birth control policies, which have been implemented
since 1980, are related to Chinese women’s timing of giving first birth during a period with substantial
socioeconomic development. The results suggest that such birth control policies still influence women’s
childbearing behavior, even after controlling for the urban/rural distinction and provincial variation;
however, this influence has diminished over time. In Chapter 2, I examine the relationship between
different motherhood stages and urban women’s economic positions in the labor market between 1991
and 2011, and how this relationship has changed with the development of local economies. The analysis
shows that very young children have an inhibiting effect on mothers’ labor force activities, and this effect
is exaggerated with the development of local economies. On the other hand, women’s income is positively
correlated with the presence of school-aged children, but this positive relationship is eroded with local
economic development. In Chapter 3, I propose that the legacies from state socialism, the reduction in
educational gender inequality, and the marketization process lead to a modern-traditional mosaic that
shapes a curvilinear relationship between gender-role ideology and fertility intentions in China.
Capitalizing on three waves of data from the Chinese General Social Survey, I empirically explore the
relationship between women’s fertility intentions of having two or more children and different gender-role
attitudes by using structural equation modeling. The results suggest that both the ‘modern’ (with more
egalitarian gender-role ideology) and ‘traditional’ (with less egalitarian gender-role ideology) women show
higher fertility intentions.
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ABSTRACT
CHINESE FERTILITY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Menghan Zhao
Hans-Peter Kohler
China has witnessed profound socioeconomic changes over the past four decades. This
dissertation is comprised of three papers that investigate the demographic, social, and economic
determinants of fertility trends in China. In Chapter 1, I discuss how birth control policies, which
have been implemented since 1980, are related to Chinese women’s timing of giving first birth
during a period with substantial socioeconomic development. The results suggest that such birth
control policies still influence women’s childbearing behavior, even after controlling for the
urban/rural distinction and provincial variation; however, this influence has diminished over time.
In Chapter 2, I examine the relationship between different motherhood stages and urban
women’s economic positions in the labor market between 1991 and 2011, and how this
relationship has changed with the development of local economies. The analysis shows that very
young children have an inhibiting effect on mothers’ labor force activities, and this effect is
exaggerated with the development of local economies. On the other hand, women’s income is
positively correlated with the presence of school-aged children, but this positive relationship is
eroded with local economic development. In Chapter 3, I propose that the legacies from state
socialism, the reduction in educational gender inequality, and the marketization process lead to a
modern-traditional mosaic that shapes a curvilinear relationship between gender-role ideology
and fertility intentions in China. Capitalizing on three waves of data from the Chinese General
Social Survey, I empirically explore the relationship between women’s fertility intentions of having
two or more children and different gender-role attitudes by using structural equation modeling.
The results suggest that both the ‘modern’ (with more egalitarian gender-role ideology) and
‘traditional’ (with less egalitarian gender-role ideology) women show higher fertility intentions.
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CHAPTER 1 : Effects of Birth Control Policies on Women’s Age at
First Birth in China
Co-authored with Hans-Peter Kohler
Introduction
The fertility transition and fertility level in China have received considerable
attention due to both the strict birth control policies and the country’s sheer population
size. The intention of limiting population growth in China started around 1953, when the
population was 581 million. In 1962, the total population increased dramatically to 700
million, which pushed the government to advocate later marriage and promote a few
urban educational programs directed towards maternal and child health. National
population policies and population programs started in the early 1970s, when the total
fertility rate (TFR) was above 5 and the population was 850 million. At this point, China
accounted for more than one fourth of the world population, but only 7 percent of the
world’s arable farmland. The ‘later, longer and fewer (wan-xi-shao)’ campaign, which
started in 1973, was the first influential national policy. It stressed later marriage (wan),
longer intervals between births (xi), and fewer children (shao). The more widely known
one-child policy was launched in 1980 when the population of China was almost 1 billion
people and the majority were to be in childbearing ages (with half under 21 years old and
two-thirds under 30 years old). However, great resistance to this strict policy resulted in a
more flexible policy known as ‘kai xiaokou, du dakou’ in 1984, allowing more couples to
have a second child, and limited births of parity three and higher as well as unauthorized
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second births. On Oct 29th, 2015, the largest change in China’s birth control policies since
the 1990s was announced – a second child is now generally allowed.
The decline of fertility in China has been remarkable, dropping from a TFR
higher than 5 in the early 1970s to replacement level (TFR around 2.1) in the early 1990s
(UNPD 2015). It continued dropping until 2000 and has stabilized around 1.60 since then.
The rapid decline of TFR has ushered in a new era with its own set of challenges, namely
population aging. The proportion of the population older than 60 years is now more than
15 percent (NBS 2015), and the baby boomers (born between 1962 and 1970) will start to
enter this group in the next couple of decades. This challenge, together with current low
fertility levels, has pushed the government to relieve the birth control policy.
Popular media and policy discussions have hence focused on one critical question
since the announcement of the policy reversal in 2015: How much influence will the
2015 loosened policy have on Chinese childbearing behavior? While there seems to be
some consensus that the potential effect is likely to be small (Attané 2016b; Buckley
2015; The Economist 2015; Zhao 2015) and that the policy should have been
implemented earlier (Hesketh, Lu, and Xing 2005; F. Wang 2005; F. Wang, Cai, and Gu
2013), there is a lack of direct micro-level analysis on nationally representative data.
After the 2015 two-child policy, there were about 17.86 million and 17.23 million births
in 2016 and 2017, respectively, compared to around 16 million in the past decade. The
number of second births increased from 6.48 million in 2015 to 7.15 million in 2016, and
further to 8.82 million in 2017 (China Daily 2018).
In this chapter, based on nationally-representative micro-level data, we examine
how past birth control policies are related to Chinese women’s age at first birth, another
2

indicator of childbearing behavior rather than fertility level, before 2005. The results
suggest that women who were prescribed to different birth control policies entered into
motherhood at different ages. This is even true for young cohorts during a period of rapid
socioeconomic development in China in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After adjusting
for geographic variation, women who were prescribed to follow less strict policies tended
to have first births earlier than those who followed the strictest one-child policy. Besides,
a U-shaped effect of policy among young cohorts is also indicated by our analysis, which
shows that the less strict policies were more related to earlier timing of childbearing
among the least educated and most educated groups.
Analyzing Effects of Birth Control Policies
The effects of the birth control policies on women’s childbearing behavior have
been debated. Some studies on policy effects claimed that around 300 to 400 million
births were averted before the 21th century in China due to the policy influence (W. Chen
and Zhuang 2004; J. Wang 2006; Mosher 2011) and more than half of the drop in
Chinese fertility from pre-transitional levels before 1970 to near replacement level in
1990 were due to government influence (Feeney and Wang 1993). A simulation of the
fertility rate (based on the experience of other countries) sought to examine what the
fertility rate in China would have been in the absence of birth control policies, and put
Chinese TFR at 2.5 in 2008 (Tao and Yang 2011), in contrast to the actual TFR of around
1.6. However, rapid socioeconomic development and globalization in recent decades
have brought about an ideational shift from resisting to embracing the ‘small family’
ideal in Chinese families (Merli and Smith 2002; H. Zhang 2007). Some evidence
suggests that China’s current low fertility is not simply a prescribed result of the one3

child policy, as socioeconomic development has played a decisive role (J. Chen et al.
2009; Zheng et al. 2009; Cai 2010). One meta-analysis reported that the ideal number of
children has stabilized between 1.6 and 1.8 since 2000 (Hou 2015).
The task of assessing the impacts of birth control polices on women’s
childbearing behavior is complicated by the fact that, since 1984, local governments have
started to make their own birth control policies. At least 20 minor exceptions have been
made for a second child (Gu et al. 2007) and the localized policies can be grouped into
four categories: 1) One-child policy: each couple is expected to have only one child. 2)
One-and-a-half-child policy: couples are allowed to have a second child after a specified
birth interval if the first birth is a girl. 3) Two-child policy: couples are allowed to have
two children. 4) Three-or-more-child policy: couples from minority groups or couples
who meet several criteria can have more than two children (Figure 1-1).
FIGURE 1-1 ABOUT HERE
It is true that these policy categories are closed related to couples’ hukou status.1
Specifically, the second policy category (one-and-a-half-child policy) was mainly applied
to people with ‘agriculture’ hukou. However, the ‘one-child policy’ or other policies do
not equal urban (including towns) or rural areas. Because of the rapid economic
development since the late 1990s, more agricultural land was (Seto, Kaufmann, and
Woodcock 2000, 20) and is being converted while the ‘agriculture’ hukou status of
people live there stayed unchanged. According to 2000 Census, people with ‘nonagriculture’ hukou only accounted for about 25 percent of the total population while
1

Hukou status is the status of each person registered in the Household Registration System in Mainland China. It
mainly has two statuses: non-agriculture and agriculture. The distinction between ‘non-agriculture’ and ‘agriculture’
hukou (which has never been registered as ‘urban’ or ‘rural’ in hukou system) was first declared officially in 1958, and
has not seen major reforms until recently (after 2010).
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about 37 percent of the total population living in urban areas. In 2005, the proportion of
people with ‘non-agriculture’ hukou increased trivially to 26 percent while the proportion
of the population living in urban areas grew to about 45 percent. Gu et al. (2007)
computed the average provincial and national policy fertility levels (zhengce shengyulu)2
based on different birth policies of 420 prefecture-level units3 in China. It turns out that
during late 1990s, only about 35.4 percent of Chinese people were covered by the onechild policy while the majority of Chinese lived in areas with a policy fertility level at 1.3
to 2.0 children per couple. Thus, even in urban areas or in the same province, different
women were prescribed to follow different policies, which is also verified in our data as
shown later. One recent study decomposed China’s fertility gaps by hukou and place of
residence (rural areas versus urban areas) by using 2011 data. The results suggested that
the effects of having a ‘non-agricultural’ hukou are more than three times larger than the
effects of urban residence on fertility (Liang and Gibson 2017).
However, most of the current research has estimated the policy effects based on
the change of aggregate fertility rate at either the regional or national level, which
estimates the fertility level of a group of women who actually followed different policies.
Given the large variation of birth control polices even within the same region, it is hard to
connect individual’s childbearing behavior to the exact policy settings by examining
aggregate data (Attané 2016a; Morgan, Guo, and Hayford 2009; Wang 2011). Others
have concentrated their studies on subgroups with less policy variation and indicated that
socioeconomic development was the most important factor of the transition to belowreplacement fertility in China (Zheng et al. 2009; Cai 2010). However, the conclusions
2
3

Fertility levels that would be obtained locally if all married couples had births at the levels permitted by local policy.
Prefecture-level units are directly under the jurisdiction of the province.
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from these studies are only for highly-selected subgroups4 (less than 10 percent of
Chinese population) and not for the general population. In all, current studies on Chinese
fertility level did not show clearly how the previous birth control policies shaped
women’s childbearing behavior at the individual level.
A further complication is that the impact of birth control policies on childbearing
behaviors is intertwined with the influence of educational expansion. According to the
sixth census conducted in 2010, only around 20 percent of the women in the 1970 birth
cohort received at least high school education, while it rose to about 38 percent for
women born in 1983 and further increased to around 50 percent for women in the 1989
birth cohort. Rapid educational expansion and socioeconomic development in China have
changed people’s fertility intentions, which mitigates the policy constraints for young
cohorts. More importantly, in China, the educational expansion helped spread the
knowledge of reproductive health and reasons for implementing birth control. Most
people started to learn the same language (Mandarin) for communication after going to
school, as the Chinese language consists of hundreds of local language varieties, many of
which are not mutually intelligible. 5 According to diffusion theory (Bongaarts and
Watkins 1996; McNicoll 2011) for contemporary fertility transitions observed in other
countries, fertility decline is not simply an adjustment to changing socioeconomic
circumstances. Social interaction, which is largely based on sharing the same language
4

The two provinces (Zhejiang and Jiangsu) studied are the most developed provinces with the highest GDP per capita
since the early 1990s. Zhejiang province was one of the only two provinces (another is Xinjiang with much less strict
birth control because of a high proportion of minority groups) that actually accomplished the goal of birth control
policies in 1989 (Peng 2009). Jiangsu province is one of the two provinces (another is Sichuan province) with the strict
one-child policy since 1980 without loosened one-and-a-half-child policies.
5
These varieties can be classified into seven to ten groups, the largest being Mandarin (e.g. Beijing dialect), Wu (e.g.
Shanghainese), Min (e.g. Taiwanese Hokkien), and Yue (e.g. Cantonese). The differences are similar to those within
the Romance languages, with variation particularly strong in the more rugged southeast, described as ‘different accents
for every 5 kilometers (shili butong yin)’ in Chinese.
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intelligible to one another, acts as a channel for fertility change. More rapid fertility
decline occurs in countries where a multiplicity of channels connects communities, and
slower fertility decline happens where such channels are sparse.
Thus, accompanied with educational expansion, the effects of birth control
policies on childbearing behavior become unclear. Though education and urbanization
were producing conditions for an incipient transition and the fertility decline was
underway in some subgroups even before direct birth control policies were implemented
(Lavely and Freedman 1990), we can never assign education as the ‘cause’ of the
substantial drop of fertility level in China. This is because women’s education levels are
also a proxy for other community-level factors, such as more developed cities with better
health services and stricter birth planning programs. Previous studies proved that the
strong relationship between education and fertility weakened in China after the onset of
government-sponsored fertility control programs, undermined by policy goals and
bureaucratic regulations tailored to specific urban levels (Lavely and Freedman 1990).
Further, concurrent with the rapid educational expansion, the composition of
women, in terms of different policies, shifts across cohorts, and affects studies on the
effects of birth control policies. A previous study has indicated that there is a lower
selectivity into higher education over time for young women who achieve higher levels
of grade attainment (Berelson 1974), especially under the rapid educational expansion.
That is, because of rapid educational expansion and also the growing urban areas, the
population composition of underlying factors affecting childbearing behaviors also
shifted, as large numbers of students who would have had limited exposure to schooling
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could now have more access to educational resources (Grant 2015). In this sense,
educational expansion has led to more heterogeneity in young cohorts.
As will be explained in the following data and method sections, we solve the first
problem by coding the exact birth control policy that a woman was prescribed to follow
and examining the timing of giving first birth rather than fertility level directly, after
controlling for the urban/rural distinction and provincial variation. The second problem is
solved by conducting statistical models separately for successive cohorts to capture the
undergoing educational expansion and its impacts on women’s childbearing behavior.
Specifically, the semi-parametric method (Cox model) used in this chapter allows us to fit
the models by allowing the hazard functions to vary across both urban/rural areas and
provinces. This method helps control for the unknown impacts from various
socioeconomic development levels and reduces the impact of the endogeneity that the
birth control policies in each province were imposed based on local conditions.
Data and Variables
Data
The data used for this chapter are a 20 percent random sample drawn from
China’s 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey (mini-census), conducted by the
National Statistics Bureau. This nationally-representative survey covers demographic
information of all household members, living conditions, and the number of children that
a woman has ever borne.
Based on this micro-level information, the specific birth control policy that a
woman was prescribed to follow can be identified according to the personal
characteristics reported in the survey. It solves the problem embedded in the previous
8

literature that the exact birth control policy cannot be identified from aggregate data. Also,
because this survey covers samples from all provinces in mainland China, individuals are
clustered in the provincial level, allowing us to control for the different socioeconomic
development speed among provinces in our statistical models.
Dependent Variable: Age at First Birth
In this chapter, we look at the impact of different birth control policies on another
important indicator of childbearing behavior, age at first birth (AFB). 6 Studying AFB
contributes to our understanding about how the birth control policies are related to
women’s timing of entering into parenthood, one of the important life-course stages. Also,
because the association between early childbearing and higher completed fertility has
long been widely observed (Bumpass, Rindfuss, and Jamosik 1978; Trussell and Menken
1978; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999), 7 studying AFB also complements the discussions on
the policy effects on women’s childbearing behavior. In Chinese contexts, it would make
sense for women who followed less strict policies to have more children during their
lifespan than women who followed the one-child policy. This is because, under less strict
policy settings in some places, the second child can only be allowed after certain years’

6

Though we have children ever born reported in these data, we cannot conduct analysis on fertility level directly. This
is because the complete cohort fertility level can only be calculated for women older than 49 years old (the oldest age
of conventional childbearing age). However, because we focus on the effect of policies after 1984 on the childbearing
behavior of women born between 1970 and 1983, women were between age 22 and age 35 in 2005. They were
censored in terms of giving birth when the survey was conducted.
7
Empirical research has also proved that, after eliminating possible genetic influences, there are connections between
age at first attempt to become pregnant and the number of children or the propensity to have any children (Kohler,
Rodgers, and Christensen 1999). A recent study based on longitudinal data also underscored the importance of
combining timing and number of outcomes, which might fruitfully be employed together in demographic modeling
(Miller, Rodgers, and Pasta 2010). All these studies suggest that the more children a couple wants to have, the sooner
they want to start having them.
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spacing. Families that have the chance to have a second child will try to avoid a late first
birth to make sure that they will not have the second child too late.8
Further, by learning how much the timing of childbearing has been affected by
these policies, we also warrant further research estimating how much the TFR change
under the universal two-child policy can be attributed to the changing timing of giving
birth and how much to the quantum fertility level. Scholars have long highlighted that the
conventional estimate of observed period TFR is biased if the timing of childbearing is
changing (Ryder 1956, 1980; Bongaarts and Feeney 1998), known as the tempo effect or
tempo distortion. Both the quantum and tempo changes, confounded with period and
cohort changes, give rise to the observed year-by-year changes in fertility rate (Bongaarts
and Sobotka 2012). The tempo-affected TFR might introduce both some
misinterpretation of fertility level trends and exaggeration of the gap between intended
and achieved family size. If the loosened policy will affect women’s AFB, further
research about the impacts of the 2015 loosened policy should take the tempo distortion
into account when studying the fluctuation of the period TFR that will be observed in the
near future.
The data provide the birth year of women and her children, so we can estimate the
AFB for women from different birth cohorts. Because different birth control policies
were implemented in 1984, we only focus on women born between 1970 and 1983 (22 to
35 years old in 2005). When the policies were localized, the 1970 cohort was 14 years old,
one year younger than the conventional used youngest age (15 years old) of childbearing
8

Our final analytical data also showed that, for those who have given birth, the younger the age at first birth, the more
children they have had. The number of children ever born (CEB) is 1.9 on average for those who gave their first births
before 20 years old, while it’s 1.4 for those whose AFB is between 20 and 24 years old. For those whose AFB is
between 25 and 29 years old, though excluding the youngest cohort born between 1980 and 1983, the number of CEB
is 1.2.
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age for women. Those born in 1983 were 22 years old 9 in 2005. The AFB is not explicitly
incorporated in the mini-census questionnaire, so we estimate AFB by subtracting the
birth year of the household head or the wife of the household head from her first child’s
birth year (see detailed description of the estimation procedure in Appendix). 10 For any
study concerning the timing of life-course events, observed cases are censored in crosssectional data. Women who had not had their first birth before 2005 are right censored
and are also included in our data.
Specifically, we also consider the potential selection issue resulting from getting
information from the women who are the household head or the wife of the household
head. That is, single or childless women are less likely to be a household head or a wife
of a household head, especially women in young cohorts who are likely to receive more
education and postpone getting married. To eliminate this selection issue, we also draw
childless women who were coded as ‘daughters’ in the household (34,162 observations),
into our database.
Independent Variable: Birth Control Policies
The coding of birth control policy for each woman is based on the major policy
settings of different local policies in 1984 as shown in Figure 1-1,11 because other

9

In China, a student who progressed through school on time and without interruptions would be expected to finish
middle school by age 15 and graduate from a university by age 22.
10
The estimation procedure is based on the assumption that whether women are matched with their children is
unrelated with their AFB because we have random samples from the original data. We are aware of the potential bias
lead from the violation of this assumption. Specifically, the numbers of children ever born (CEB) of migrant mothers
are less likely to be matched with the number of children within household. However, because rural-urban migrants
account for most of the migrants in China, the likelihood of separation is expected to be higher for women from less
development places with loosened birth control (and also those who are more likely to give birth early). Thus, the
exclusion of women whose reported CEB is unmatched with their children within household tend to give us more
conservative estimates of the policy impacts.
11
For those who can follow less strict policies, information of both couple is needed, thus there is a potential selection
in that who can follow less strict policies are selected with higher risk of giving birth by being married. We also run
robust test (Appendix Table 1-1 and Appendix Table 1-2) after adopting a different strategy of coding, in which the
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exceptions for a second child or child at higher order only cover a trivial proportion (Gu
et al. 2007, 20). Two categories of birth control policies are specified in this analysis: the
strictest one-child policy and the less strict policies, including the one-and-a-half-child
policy, two-child policy and the three-or-more-child policy.
The criteria for different birth control policies mainly consist of three components:
hukou status, minority or not, and provinces where the hukou is registered for both the
women and her husband. As explained, the distinction between ‘non-agriculture ’ and
‘agriculture’ in hukou status is not equivalent to the distinction between urban and rural
area, especially under rapid development and the urbanization process. Actually,
according to the published aggregate data of the 2005 mini-census, people with ‘nonagriculture’ hukou only account for 53.43 percent in the urban population, which means
almost half of the urban population have ‘agriculture’ hukou. Even in Beijing, about 35
percent people had ‘agriculture’ hukou in 2005, and this proportion was around 33
percent in Shanghai. As will be explained later, we also include the variable indicating
the distinction between urban and rural areas into our model. In fact, in our final analytic
data, about 37 percent of the women who could follow less strict policies lived in urban
areas and 12 percent of women who had to follow the one-child policy lived in rural
places.
For married women with matched husband’s information or women with nonagricultural hukou, the birth control policies that they were prescribed to follow can be
easily identified. However, the policy cannot be directly identified for women who are

exact birth control policy that a woman has to follow only depends on her own characteristics. Because only the
information of female is needed by this strategy, all the 145,025 observations are utilized in the robust tests. The results
of these robust tests also support our argument.
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married but missing husbands’ information or single with agricultural hukou, because the
information on the husband is needed to meet the criteria for less strict birth control
policies. We solve this problem in two steps. First, we assume that those who were not
migrants in 2005 were likely to be married to males with the same hukou and follow less
strict policies. This assumption is legitimate because our sample only consists of those
older than age 22, and most of them should have finished their education. It is unlikely
for them to change hukou status, because the transition of hukou status is most likely to
happen when people graduate from universities or colleges. Also, even if single women
with agricultural hukou moved to urban areas after 2005, they were unlikely to marry a
man with non-agricultural hukou, who was considered more advantageous, because of the
traditional hypergamy in China (Mu and Xie 2014; Yu and Xie 2015). Second, single
female migrants with agricultural hukou are also coded to follow the less strict policies
and contribute person months to this category to provide a relatively conservative
estimate. That is, we code the policies only based on the eligibility of female. Less than
1.8 percent of the cases cannot be coded for this main independent variable in our study.
Our final dataset has 142,475 observations. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table
1-1.
TABLE 1-1 ABOUT HERE
Statistical Methods and Model Specification
We use the extended Cox regression to model the effects of different birth control
policies on the hazard rate of entry into parenthood. Compared with parametric models of
event history analysis, the Cox model uses partial likelihood estimation (semi-parametric
13

model). This method works reasonably well with a wide range of baseline hazard
functions when the shape of the hazard function is not a priori known, which allows us to
control for the possible socioeconomic effects, differences in urban and rural area, and
also the provincial variation even when their impacts are unknown. We stack the data
into a person-month structure and the Efron method is used for better approximation of
Cox regression for discrete-time data (Allison 2014). For this analysis, the risk of giving
birth is assumed to begin at age 15. Though the legal age of marriage in China is 22 years
old for males and 20 years old for females since 1981, some people still take the wedding
date as the start of marriage (instead of registered marriage), which is accepted by friends
and relatives. Births given after this culturally accepted marriage are rarely considered as
births out of wedlock. Some Chinese studies have suggested it true even for recent
cohorts (Yu and Xie 2015).
As explained, selectivity12 is high for old cohorts, because women who had more
access to education were living in urban areas and also had to follow the strictest onechild policy. Nevertheless, women in young cohorts within high educational level tended
to show more variation of birth control policies, and revealed stronger policy effects than
women from older cohorts because of more heterogeneity within them. To capture the
changing relationship between policies and education over time, we conduct analysis on
childbearing behavior separately for successive birth cohorts. Due to fast socioeconomic
change, especially educational expansion, we divide all the birth cohorts (born between
1970 and 1983) into three groups: Cohort I (born between 1970 and 1974), Cohort II
(born between 1975 and 1979), and Cohort III (born between 1980 and 1983).
In this chapter, ‘selectivity’ is termed as women who are the most educated and tend to be those who have to follow
the strictest one-child policy.
12
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For control variables, because the hukou status (non-agriculture or agriculture) is
the main criterion of birth control policy and different from urban/rural distinction, it is
not included in the model. Instead, we conduct Cox models with stratification by both
actual urban/rural distinction and provinces in our analysis, with the assumption that the
baseline hazard is different for urban and rural area, and also different for each province.
So both the urban/rural differences and impact of endogeneity of local policies across
provinces can be controlled in our analysis. 13
Results
Patterns of Timing at First Birth
We describe how patterns of timing at first birth changed with respect to different
policies and educational levels for different cohorts, respectively. We present the first
quartile (25%), median (50%) and third quartile (75%) of the age at first birth by cohorts
and policies in Table 1-2, and also by cohorts and educational levels in Table 1-3. For
example, in Table 1-2, for women from Cohort II following the one-child policy, 25%
gave birth before age 24 and half of them gave birth before age 27. Because the sample is
censored at age 22-25 for Cohort III, some information is missing in some of the
percentiles. For the women in the youngest cohort group following the one-child policy,
less than 25% gave birth when they took the 2005 mini census.
TABLE 1-2 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 1-3 ABOUT HERE

There are 31 provinces in the data and binary distinction between rural and urban area. We use the option ‘strata’
with both variables included.
13
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Comparing the timing of giving first birth, young cohorts postponed their
childbearing behavior substantially. 25% of women from Cohort I and Cohort II gave
birth to their first child before age 21 and before age 22, respectively. But for Cohort III,
one-quarter of them gave birth before 24 years old. We also find a general pattern of
earlier childbearing across women who followed less strict birth control policies within
each cohort group. For example, in Cohort I, 25% of women following the one-child
policy had their first birth before age 22, but for those following less strict policies, it was
age 21. In Cohort II, half of the women who followed the one-child policy gave birth
before age 27, but for women who followed less strict policies, half of them gave birth
before age 23. Less than one quarter of the women who followed the one-child policy in
Cohort III gave birth before 2005, but of those who followed less strict policies, 25%
gave birth before 23 years old. Additionally, within each cohort group, women with
higher educational levels tended to give birth later (Table 1-3). This corresponds to the
findings in other research about the timing of first birth and education.
In sum, the postponement of childbearing behavior is clear across cohorts. Within
each cohort group, both the birth control policies and educational attainment are
associated with the timing of first birth.
Impacts of Birth Control Policies and Educational Expansion
Table 1-4 presents coefficients from the Cox models by different cohort groups.
Negative coefficients indicate lower risks of entry into parenthood, namely older age at
first birth and/or higher chance of childlessness. The first columns for each cohort group
are the baseline models with our main independent variables. The results in the second
columns are non-proportional models after specifying the stratification by urban/rural
16

distinction and provinces, which allows for different hazard functions of time for both
urban/rural distinction and for each province without making any parametric assumption
(Allison 2014). Thus, these models not only account for the significant urban/rural
differences within China, but also take the impact of varying development speeds or
trajectories of different provinces into account. By comparing the coefficients of policies
between models with and without varying hazard functions across rural/urban area and
provinces within each cohort group, we can see that the effect sizes of policies are bigger
in models with varying hazard functions.
TABLE 1-4 ABOUT HERE
The models for all three cohorts show positive impacts of less strict birth control
policies on hazards of entering into motherhood.14 For Cohort I, compared with women
following one-child policy, women who were eligible for less strict policies have 32.84%
(

) higher hazards of parenthood. For Cohort II and Cohort III, the

hazards are 23.49% and 14.57% higher for women following less strict policies than
those who followed one-child policy. These persistent policy effects suggest that women
who were eligible for less strict polices tended to give birth earlier than those who
followed the one-child policy for all the cohorts. However, the coefficient of policies is
getting smaller15, which is consistent with the claim made in previous studies that the

14

For the youngest cohort group, we also conducted analysis on the data from 2015 inter-census survey (1984 birth
cohort is also included). With more information available, we have more controlled variables and specified the policy
variables as time-varying variables. As shown in Appendix Table 1-3, the results support our argument that the birth
control policies still affect women’s childbearing behavior, and the least educated and the most educated groups are
more likely to be affected by the policy change.
15
The difference between the coefficients in Model A2 and Model B2 is significant at 0.05 level, because z score =
The difference between the coefficients in Model B2 and Model C2 is significant at 0.1 level, because z score =
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impact of birth control policies is smaller in younger cohorts. Besides, the effect sizes of
educational levels are a lot bigger in young cohorts, which also suggests that
socioeconomic development has gradually changed people’s fertility intentions
independently of policies.
TABLE 1-5 ABOUT HERE
The results in Table 1-5 present the coefficients of policies, education, and their
interaction terms. For Cohort I, none of the coefficients of the interaction terms is
statistically significant, which indicates the same policy effects for all the educational
levels. For Cohort II, one interaction term shows significant different hazards of giving
birth. For women who were illiterate or finished primary school, those who followed less
strict policies have 33.78% (

) higher hazards of giving first birth

than those who followed the one-child policy. Moreover, for Cohort III, both of the
interaction terms become statistically significant and positive, which indicates that after
the educational expansion, there was more heterogeneity within each educational level.
The AIC and BIC also indicate that the inclusion of the interaction terms improve the
models for the young cohorts but not the older cohorts. Both of the measures show that
for the Cohort I, the model without the interaction terms is better than that with the
interaction terms. However, for Cohort III, the model with the interaction terms has
smaller AIC and BIC than the model without the interaction term. Thus, we expect a Ushaped influence of policy among people with different educational levels. That is, the
least educated and the most educated groups are more likely to be affected by the policy
than the average educated group.
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As suggested in previous sections, the rapid educational expansion might have
changed the composition of fertility intentions among those who can follow the less strict
policy in the highly educated group, contributing to the strong interactive effects. To
verify this speculation, we further compare the composition of women following different
birth control policies among those who graduated from high school or above across
cohorts in Table 1-6. In Cohort I, only 9.99% of women who had finished at least high
school were eligible for less strict policies, but this proportion increased to 15.42% in
Cohort II and further grew to 21.40% in Cohort III. We can also find some proof by
comparing the educational composition within woman who followed the same policy
across cohorts in Table 1-7. Overall, educational improvement was fast across cohorts.
The biggest absolute increase of the proportion of women graduated from high school or
above happened to women who followed the one-child policy. However, the proportion
of those graduating from high school or above tripled from about 4% in Cohort I to
around 15% in Cohort III for those who were eligible for less strict policies. Thus, for
women who followed less strict policies, the educational expansion was more efficient
than those who followed one-child policy. With the educational expansion, women who
followed less strict policies from Cohort III were more likely to achieve higher
educational level than previous cohorts. 16 Also, for those who were highly educated, the
variation of birth control polices was bigger in Cohort III than in Cohort I and II.
TABLE 1-6 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 1-7 ABOUT HERE
16

The odds of graduating from high school or above if being eligible for less strict policies for Cohort III are 1.49 times
the odds of Cohort II, and the odds for Cohort II are 1.64 times the odds for Cohort I.
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In summary, our analyses of policies and comparisons between cohorts suggest
that Chinese women’s childbearing behavior postponed considerably under the rapid
socioeconomic development, and the constraints imposed by the policies weakened over
time. However, even for young cohorts, the birth control polices still affected women’s
childbearing behavior significantly after controlling for both urban/rural differences and
regional variation. Along with educational expansion, the underlying shifting
composition in more educated women across cohorts promised greater heterogeneity of
childbearing behaviors and larger variation of birth control policies in younger and more
educated cohorts. The results also showed that even for the more educated population,
women who were eligible for less strict policies tended to give birth earlier and might
have had more children than their counterparts. Thus, for young cohorts, the policies
presented a U-shaped impact, implying that the least educated and the most educated
groups were likely to be most affected by a less restrictive birth-control policy.
Conclusion and Discussion
Previous studies on the impact of China’s birth control policies on childbearing
behaviors provided a mixed picture. The controversies over policy effects rise from the
difficulty in disentangling the influences of socioeconomic development on changing
people’s childbearing behavior. Also, the complicated birth control polices (Gu et al.
2007) prevented the studies on aggregate-level fertility from revealing the policy effects
on individual’s childbearing behavior. Capitalizing on micro-level data with individuallevel policy identification, we try to solve these two problems by 1) identifying the exact
policy that a woman is prescribed to follow, 2) conducting analysis separately for
successive cohorts to control for cohort effects, and 3) adopting stratification methods in
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the Cox model to control for both urban/rural and regional differences, and also minimize
the period effects. We also contribute to the studies on Chinese women’s childbearing
behavior by examining the timing of giving first births rather than fertility level directly.
Our descriptive results suggest that the postponement of childbearing behavior was
remarkable across cohorts. Within each cohort group, women with higher educational
level tended to have their first births later, which is consistent with other studies. Besides,
women who were eligible for less strict policies also had their first birth earlier than those
who had to follow the strictest one-child policy, suggesting strong effects of the policy on
women’s childbearing behavior even among young women in recent cohorts.
Through the comparisons of multivariate analyses among cohorts, we find that
both birth control policies and education were important factors shaping young Chinese
women’s childbearing behavior after controlling for urban/rural distinction and regional
variation. More importantly, we find that the interactions between policies and education
were significant for women in younger cohorts while no strong interactive effects were
shown for older cohorts. For young cohorts, the least educated group is selected to be
those who live in least developed area with more traditional high fertility intentions, so
they’re more likely to react to the policy change. However, for the most educated group,
the intuitive explanation is different. Under rapid educational expansion, some of the
highly educated younger cohorts, who still live in less developed area and have not
converged to very low fertility intentions, still tend to have a second child and give birth
early under more loosened policy. Though the rural reforms initiated in the early 1980s
gradually convinced couples of the benefits of fewer children, it does not weaken the
motivation for at least one son (Greenhalgh, Zhu, and Li 1994) or having more than one
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child. As a result, there is a U-shaped effect of policy: being subject to a more relaxed
policy regime had the strongest accelerating effect on childbearing among the least
educated (a group diminishing in size) and among the most educated (a group that is
rapidly expanding).
Some studies indicate that socioeconomic development is the reason for the drop
of fertility level in China (Zheng et al. 2009; Cai 2010; F. Wang, Whyte, and Cai 2015).
However, our results suggest that we cannot come to this conclusion for sure, because
birth control policies are still imposed in China and counterfactual facts can hardly be
built. Highly educated people showed higher acceptance of birth control policies (Merli
and Smith 2002) partly because they were more likely to have lower fertility intentions,
but they were also who were most likely to understand the rationale of implementing
birth control policies in China. Now, after decades of rapid educational expansion, the
highly educated groups had more heterogeneity and more variation of birth control
policies, so the strong policy effects started to show for these highly educated people. An
old Chinese proverb goes, ‘It takes ten years to grow trees but a hundred years to rear
people.’ Even though fast urbanization, educational expansion, and low fertility
intentions produced the conditions for low fertility level in China, some Chinese still
constrain their childbearing behavior to keep the low birth rate.
Our analysis also points to the impacts of 2015 loosened policy on the timing of
giving first birth. Because women who followed less strict birth control policies tended to
have their first births earlier, after controlling for other variables, we would expect that,
under the 2015 universal two-child policy, women will give birth earlier and might have
more children during their lifespan. This will push up the quantum level of period fertility
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rate. Also, the changing timing of giving birth will bring tempo distortion to the fertility
measure. However, the rise of the fertility rate might be temporary, because the results
also show that the effect size of policies is declining with the impact of education
growing across cohorts. Besides, as revealed in some studies, any serious change in
China’s birth control policies is likely to derive from initiatives at the local level (Merli,
Qian, and Smith 2004). The policy change was made only after the government believed
there will be an appropriate reaction, which is neither a remarkable rise nor no effects at
all. The elimination of the strict one-child policy, in our opinion, is therefore likely to
lead to a rise of fertility rate in the short term, while overall, fertility will remain at a low
level in the long run.
The great shift of Chinese ideational change toward small family makes the strict
birth control unnecessary. The change to a general two-child policy might not receive
impressive reaction from the young cohorts. The long-term low fertility intentions
guarantee that the fertility rate will not rise substantially under the loosened policy. Also,
the increasing cost of raising a child has become a main concern of young cohorts about
giving birth (Attané 2016b). Besides, research has suggested that women’s position in the
labor market has deteriorated in urban China (S. Li and Ma 2007; C. Li and Li 2008),
after the government stopped guaranteeing jobs to graduates after 1996. Specifically, the
worsening trend is concentrated among mothers (Y. Zhang and Hannum 2015). The
increasing wage gap between mothers and childless women in urban China was partly
due to the economic transition that shifted part of the cost of childbearing from the state
and employers back to women (Jia and Dong 2012). The growing gender inequality
might lead to lower fertility of women.
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This increasing gender inequality might be a resistance to the decreasing trend of
son preference. Many studies revealed that the son preference affects the fertility level
positively and the actual fertility level is higher than the desired fertility level due to son
preference (J. Song and Tao 2012). Empirical analysis on fertility intentions of migrants
(Yang 2015) indicates that people may internalize the norms of having fewer children,
but having a son remains a must. This will lead to the uncertainty of Chinese fertility
level, and it may maintain higher fertility in China than that in South Korea or Japan. So
other related policies should be accompanied with the loosening of the birth control,
either for embracing the challenge or for people’s wellbeing.
As with most studies on this topic, this study is limited in some ways. First, we do
not have enough details to identify the individuals who were prescribed to less strict
policies, including whether either husband or wife came from one-child family. Second,
the policies are identified only based on provincial information, while more complicated
policies (more exceptions to allow a second child) were implemented at prefectural level.
Third, other possible variables - household economic conditions, family background,
local culture/neighborhood pressure of son preference - that are also related to the policy
status are not included in the analysis should be considered in further research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1-1 Descriptive statistics of main variables by cohort groups
Cohort I
(born in 19701974)

Cohort II
(born in 19751979)

Cohort III
(born in 19801983)

Birth Policy (%)
One-child policy

43.00

45.64

43.23

Less strict policies

57.00

54.36

56.77

Illiteracy or primary school

31.78

22.98

14.54

Middle school

44.90

42.72

45.81

High school or above

23.32

34.30

39.65

Urban (%)

48.09

41.42

41.21

Rural (%)

51.91

58.58

58.79

Number of observations

61,179

43,037

38,259

Number of births

56,665

29,232

8,137

Education (%)

Urban or rural area
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Table 1-2 Younger age at first birth for women
who are prescribed to follow less strict policies across three cohort groups
Age at First Birth
25%

50%

75%

N

21

23

26

61,179

One-child policy

22

25

27

26,309

Less strict policies

21

23

25

34,870

22

25

.

43,037

One-child policy

24

27

.

19,640

Less strict policies

21

23

27

23,397

24

.

.

38,259

.

.

.

16,539

23

.

.

21,720

Cohort I (born in 1970-1974)

Cohort II (born in 1975-1979)

Cohort III (born in 1980-1983)
One-child policy
Less strict policies

Note: because the sample is censored at age 25-30 for Cohort II and age 22-25 for Cohort III, some
information is missing in some of the percentiles.
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Table 1-3 Younger age at first birth for women with lower educational levels
across three cohort groups
Age at First Birth
25%

50%

75%

N

21

23

26

61,179

Illiteracy or Primary School

20

22

24

19,445

Middle School

21

23

25

27,468

High School or above

24

26

29

14,266

22

25

.

43,037

Illiteracy or Primary School

20

22

25

9,888

Middle School

22

24

27

18,386

High School or above

25

29

.

14,763

24

.

.

38,259

Illiteracy or Primary School

21

24

.

5,564

Middle School

23

.

.

17,526

.

.

.

15,169

Cohort I (born in 1970-1974)

Cohort II (born in 1975-1979)

Cohort III (born in 1980-1983)

High School or above
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Table 1-4 Cox model predicting hazard of first birth, by cohort
Cohort I

Cohort II

Cohort III

(born in 1970-1974)

(born in 1975-1979)

(born in 1980-1983)

Model A1

Model A2

Model B1

Model B2

Model C2

Model C2

0.221***

0.284***

0.195***

0.211***

0.115***

0.136***

(0.010)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.018)

(0.029)

(0.037)

0.218***

0.160***

0.374***

0.277***

0.720***

0.548***

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.014)

(0.015)

(0.025)

(0.027)

-0.553***

-0.455***

-0.864***

-0.768***

-1.326***

-1.300***

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.037)

(0.039)

Hazard functions vary across rural/urban area

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Hazard functions vary across provinces

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Number of subjects

61,179

61,179

43,037

43,037

38,259

38,259

Number of births

56,665

56,665

29,232

29,232

8,137

8,137

AIC

1,150,763

709,323

583,415

353,844

160,776

96,383

BIC

1,150,790

709,350

583,441

353,870

160,802

96,408

Birth Control Policies (Ref: One-child policy)
Less strict policies

Educational Level (Ref: Middle school)
Illiteracy or primary school
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High school or above

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 1-5 Cox models predicting hazards of first birth, by cohort,
with interaction between education and policy
Cohort I
(born in 19701974)

Cohort II
(born in 19751979)

Cohort III
(born in 19801983)

0.270***
(0.016)

0.210***
(0.022)

-0.017
(0.042)

0.135***
(0.023)
-0.467***
(0.015)

0.208***
(0.037)
-0.763***
(0.021)

0.355***
(0.077)
-1.517***
(0.048)

0.034
(0.025)
0.048
High school or above* Less strict policies
(0.033)
Hazard functions vary across rural/urban area
Yes
Hazard functions vary across provinces
Yes
Number of subjects
61,179
Number of births
56,665
AIC
709,323
BIC
709,368
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.081*
(0.040)
-0.037
(0.038)
Yes
Yes
43,037
29,232
353,842
353,885

0.235**
(0.082)
0.550***
(0.075)
Yes
Yes
38,259
8,137
96,333
96,375

Birth Control Policies (Ref: One-child policy)
Less strict policies
Educational Level (Ref: Middle school)
Illiteracy or primary school
High school or above
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Interaction between Education and Policy
Illiteracy or primary school * Less strict policies

Table 1-6 Proportion of following different policies
for women who graduated from high school or above
Proportion of Following Different Policies (%)
One-Child policy

Less strict policies

Cohort I (born in 1970-1974)

90.01

9.99

Cohort II (born in 1975-1979)

84.58

15.42

Cohort III (born in 1980-1983)

78.60

21.40
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Table 1-7 Proportion of graduating from high school or above
for women who followed different policies
Proportion of Women Who Graduated from High School or above (%)
Cohort I

Cohort II

Cohort III

(born in 1970-1974)

(born in 1975-1979)

(born in 1980-1983)

One-Child Policy

48.81

63.58

72.09

Less strict policies

4.09

9.73

14.94
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Figure 1-1 Variation in birth control policies in China between 1973 and 2005
‘Later,
longer and
fewer’
policy

One-child
policy

One-child
policy (with
about 20
exceptions)

Either of the couple has non-agricultural hukou
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces
Chongqing (had been a part of Sichuan province till 1997)
2005

1973

1980

1984
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Less
strict
policies

One-and-a-halfchild policy

Both of the couple have agricultural hukou in 19 provinces

Two-child
policy

The couple are both the single child in their own family
(gradually implemented in provinces)
Both couple have agricultural hukou in Ningxia, Yunnan, Qinghai,
Guangdong, Hainan
The couple are both from minority groups (14 provinces)
The couple are both from minority groups and at least one is
agricultural hukou , or both agricultural hukou and at least
one is from minority groug (Liaoning and Hunan)
The couple are both from agricultural hukou and at least one is
from minority group (Guizhou)
The couple are both from minority groups and agricultural hukou
(Henan and Gansu)
Non-agricultural hukou in Tibet

Three-or-morechild policy

The couple are both from minority groups whose population is
smaller than 100 thousand
(Neimeng, Guizhou, Ningxia and Yunnan)
At least one of the couple is from 4 minority groups (Heilongjiang)
Agricultural hukou in Tibet

Note: Only major birth control policies are listed.

Appendix
APPENDIX Table 1-1 Robust tests for models in Table 1-4
Cohort I
(born in 1970-1974)
Model A1 Model A2
Birth Control Policies (Ref: One-child policy)
Less strict policies
Educational Level (Ref: Middle school)
Illiteracy or primary school

0.194***
(0.010)

0.260***
(0.014)

Cohort II
(born in 1975-1979)
Model B1 Model B2
0.200***
(0.015)

0.266***
(0.019)

Cohort III
(born in 1980-1983)
Model C2 Model C2
0.210***
(0.030)

0.323***
(0.038)
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0.223***
0.160***
0.377***
0.276***
0.706***
0.542***
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.025)
(0.027)
***
***
***
***
***
High school or above
-0.556
-0.446
-0.839
-0.724
-1.267
-1.221***
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(0.037)
(0.039)
Hazard functions vary across rural/urban area
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Hazard functions vary across provinces
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Number of subjects
62,088
62,088
44,016
44,016
38,921
38,921
Number of births
57,484
57,484
29,931
29,931
8,418
8,418
AIC
1,169,456
721,499
598,847
363,628
166,614
99,956
BIC
1,169,484
721,526
598,873
363,654
166,640
99,982
Note: For those who can follow less strict policies, information of both couple is needed, thus there is a potential selection in that who can follow
less strict policies are selected with higher risk of giving birth by being married. Thus, models in Appendix Table 1-1 and Appendix Table 1-2
are conducted as robust tests, in which the exact birth control policy that a woman has to follow only depends on her own characteristics.
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

APPENDIX Table 1-2 Robust tests for models in Table 1-5
Cohort I
(born in 1970-1974)

Cohort II
(born in 1975-1979)

Cohort III
(born in 1980-1983)

0.248***
(0.016)

0.246***
(0.022)

0.209***
(0.043)

0.142***
(0.023)
-0.457***
(0.015)

0.224***
(0.039)
-0.742***
(0.022)

0.388***
(0.081)
-1.381***
(0.050)

0.023
(0.026)
0.046
High school or above* Less strict policies
(0.032)
Hazard functions vary across rural/urban area
Yes
Hazard functions vary across provinces
Yes
Number of subjects
62,088
Number of births
57,484
AIC
721,501
BIC
721,546
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.061
(0.042)
0.048
(0.039)
Yes
Yes
44,016
29,931
363,629
363,672

0.182*
(0.086)
0.377***
(0.076)
Yes
Yes
38,921
8,418
99,935
99,978

Birth Control Policies (Ref: One-child policy)
Less strict policies
Educational Level (Ref: Middle school)
Illiteracy or primary school
High school or above
Interaction between Education and Policy
Illiteracy or primary school * Less strict
policies
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APPENDIX Table 1-3 Cox model predicting hazard of first birth
Cohort born in 1980-1984
Birth Control Policies (Ref: One-child policy)
Two-child policy
1.5-chd policy
Educational Level (Ref: Middle school)
primary school or lower
high school/vocational school
college or above

0.100**
(0.032)
0.150***
(0.026)

0.078*
(0.032)
0.163***
(0.027)

-0.116
(0.073)
0.160***
(0.033)

0.099**
(0.031)
-0.310***
(0.024)
-0.752***
(0.025)

0.130***
(0.031)
-0.331***
(0.025)
-0.831***
(0.030)

0.083
(0.053)
-0.339***
(0.031)
-0.845***
(0.033)

Interaction between Education and Policy
Two-child policy * primary school or lower

0.452**
(0.152)
0.151
(0.098)
0.245**
(0.082)
0.045
(0.065)
0.014
(0.052)
-0.094
(0.077)

Two-child policy * high school/vocational school
Two-child policy * college or above
1.5-chd policy* primary school or lower
1.5-chd policy* high school/vocational school
1.5-chd policy* college or above
Pension (ref: rural pension)
No pension
State-owned pension
Urban residential pension
Health insurance (ref: rural health insurance)
No health insurance
State-owned insurance
Urban residential insurance
Housing (ref: self-built)
Self-owned
Rent
Others (no house or live collectively)
Car ownership (ref: no car)
<100,000RMB car
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-0.123***
(0.029)
-0.059
(0.071)
-0.104*
(0.041)

-0.123***
(0.029)
-0.055
(0.071)
-0.104*
(0.041)

-0.194***
(0.043)
-0.156*
(0.072)
-0.036
(0.037)

-0.192***
(0.043)
-0.159*
(0.072)
-0.034
(0.037)

0.122***
(0.029)
0.033
(0.034)
-0.006
(0.043)

0.121***
(0.029)
0.032
(0.034)
-0.005
(0.043)

0.354***
(0.024)

0.353***
(0.024)

0.368*** 0.366***
(0.027)
(0.027)
>200,000RMB car
0.419*** 0.415***
(0.041)
(0.041)
Hazard functions vary across rural/urban area
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hazard functions vary across counties (xian)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No. of subjects
28,163
28,163
28,163
No. of births
22,812
22,812
22,812
AIC
76007
75543
75538
BIC
76061
75725
75785
Note: In 2013, a minor change in China’s birth control policies allowed couples to have a second child
if one of the couple comes from a one-child family. Because the 2015 inter census survey asked about
family types (whether the couple is from one-child family), women who transited from following onechild policy to two-child policy after 2013 can be identified. Thus, the variables of policies can be
coded according to the exact year that policy changed and become time-varying variables.
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
100,000-200,000RMB car
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Description of the estimation procedure
To estimate AFB for each woman, we need to know the birth date of her first child.
However, the birth date of the first child is not explicitly incorporated in the mini-census
questionnaire. Instead, it includes a question on the number of children ever born (CEB).
Therefore, the women’s AFB is established using the following procedure, which is an
innovation, because previous studies in this line of research have not tried to calculate
AFB in this way.
1.

For each woman selected, we have information on the children that live in her
household. The original data frame was transformed from one observation per
individual to be one observation per household (i.e. from long form to wide
form) (Appendix Figure 1-1). Then, only women whose reported CEB equals
to the number of children living in the household are kept in our final
analytical data, leading to 145,025 matched women out of 160,180
observations (for women born between 1970 and 1983), based on the
assumption that whether being matched or not is unrelated to woman’s AFB.
APPENDIX FIGURE 1-1 ABOUT HERE

2.

After matching the number of CEB reported by the women and the number of
children living together, the first child can be identified by comparing
children’s years of birth. Because the mini census reports the year and month
of births of all household members, woman’s AFB can be estimated as the
difference between the birth year of the woman and her first child identified.
All the women were between 22 and 35 years old in our sample and underfive mortality in China is low (< 40 per 1,000 in 2000 and <23 per 1,000 in
2005 (WHO 2015)), so it is reasonable to assume that children are living
together with their mother.
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APPENDIX Figure 1-1 Data transformation from long form to wide form
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CHAPTER 2 : From Motherhood Premium to Motherhood Penalty?
Heterogeneous Effects of Motherhood Stages on Women’s
Economic Outcomes in Urban China

Introduction
When an egalitarian division of labor within households exists and public policies
make it easier for women to balance work and childrearing, women typically have more
children. This relationship between fertility and women’s labor has played out across
socioeconomic contexts and policy regimes, revealing much about trends in gender
equity (McDonald 2000; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Rindfuss, Choe, and
Brauner-Otto 2016; Brinton and Lee 2016).
Over the past three decades, China has witnessed an unprecedented pace of
economic development and remarkable social changes. Chinese women have experienced
labor equity and benefitted from public policies that provided working mothers with
benefits including childcare. However, with the transition from a state-controlled to a
market-oriented economy, gone are the traditional protections and assistance for women
in the workplace. As a result, there is growing gender disparity in the labor market and a
widening gap between what women and men earn (Zhang and Hannum, 2015). What is
the contemporary relationship between fertility and women’s labor market activities?
China presents an interesting setting for the analysis of the interrelation of fertility,
women’s economic activities, gender-role ideologies, and the impact of changes in public
policy and labor market forms. At the height of the socialist period, a state-controlled
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economy guaranteed employment. Unemployment was an unknown phenomenon and
most women worked because governmental policies made it easier for them to do so.
With the transition to a market-oriented economy, these protections were lost, and the
country saw a decline in the number of women working outside the home. This runs
counterintuitively to what happens in developed nations where female labor force
participation rates and income increase rapidly during industrialization (Goldin 2006).
Although, all socialist societies once shared common economic and political institutions,
differences between the former Soviet Bloc and other socialist societies have become
more pronounced over time (Brainerd 2000; Fodor and Glass 2018; Heyns 2005). For
example, China did not embrace capitalism and institutional arrangements that promised
economic achievement equal to that of Western countries. Instead, China achieved its
development by gradually experimenting with market mechanism. Also, the underlying
fertility and family changes in China differ from those of other former socialist societies.
China implemented strict birth control and experienced a rapid decline in fertility level
from 6 in the 1960s to below-replacement level in 1990s. By comparison, the fertility
level in most Soviet Bloc societies was already less than 3 in the 1960s (UNPD 2015),
and some of them even implemented pro-natalist policies (Sobotka et al. 2008).
In the decades before transition to a market-oriented economy, Chinese women
were in the labor force because state policies promoted their participation. When the
market economy cost urban women job benefits such as free child care, women began to
leave the workforce (Fincher 2016). This is partly because the traditional gender-role
ideologies and gender divisions within household still persist in Chinese society (Lu and
Zhang 2016; Zuo and Bian 2001). Whether they work outside the home or not, women
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bear a greater burden for childcare and domestic work than men. This traditional
gendered labor division tends to lower women’s labor force participation (Hare 2016;
Zhang and Hannum 2015). Labor market reforms have led to competition for the best
jobs, and women perceive that they are routinely discriminated against by employers who
favor hiring, promoting, and paying higher salaries to men. Previous studies support this
perception and report that discrimination against female workers leads to two-thirds of
the gendered pay gap (Xiu and Gunderson 2013). Do family obligations account for the
rest of the gap in employment and financial outcomes? If so, do mothers catch a break
when their children are infants, school-age, or older?
Previous studies on the relationship between women’s economic outcomes and
their responsibilities for childrearing have rarely taken into account the relationship
between the stages of motherhood and women’s economic activities. Even fewer studies
have linked this relationship to the development of local economies after 1990s, a period
of profound socioeconomic and institutional changes in mainland China. Capitalizing on
data from a longitudinal survey, this study uses a person-fixed-effects model to examine
how urban Chinese women’s economic outcomes are related to different stages in the
growth of their children.
Motherhood and Women’s Economic Activities
Since the end of World War II, women’s educational attainment and labor force
participation have increased globally (Charles 2011), and human fertility has declined.
Although the causal mechanisms linking fertility to women’s labor market participation
remain elusive, the association between the two indicates the challenges of balancing
work and family in industrialized societies. At the individual level, the negative effect of
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children on women’s economic outcomes has been observed and called ‘the motherhood
penalty’ (Waldfogel 1997; Angrist and Evans 1998; Budig and England 2001). Based on
the comparative advantages of men and women, the economic model of within-household
specialization posits a gendered labor division with the higher wage earner (usually the
husband) specializing in market work, while the other spouse (usually the wife)
specializes in domestic work (Becker 1991).
However, recent macro-level evidence suggests a positive relationship between
fertility and development level measured by Human Development Index (Myrskylä,
Kohler, and Billari 2009), and even an positive association between fertility and women’s
labor force participation, in societies reaching a certain development level (Goldscheider,
Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). This positive relationship between children and
women’s economic outcomes challenges the dominant discourse about the negative
relationship and warrants a closer examination.
A number of theories, such as gender equity (McDonald 2000; T. Anderson and
Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015), labor market institutions and related
social policies (Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016; Brinton and Lee 2016), have
been introduced to explain the changing effects of children on women’s economic
activities. Broadly speaking, the expansion of education (especially for women), the
advent of modern labor economics, and the development of household labor-saving
technologies have led to a change in women’s economic roles (Goldin 2006; Stevenson
and Wolfers 2007). Women have transitioned from secondary workers, who accepted the
burden of domestic work and child care as well, to active participants in the workforce,
who expect to hold jobs and make decisions with other household members about the
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division of labor at home (Goldin 2006). These opportunities for employment coupled
with the greater share of domestic work have led to very low fertility in advanced
countries over the past century. However, as men step up their participation in childcare
and domestic work, a higher level of within-household gender equity and economic
outcomes can be achieved (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). Specifically,
highly-educated husbands and wives are more likely to share household chores more
equitably (Cherlin 2016). As a result, these wives are less likely to experience the
motherhood penalty (D. J. Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Budig and Hodges 2014).
Overall, the relationship between women’s economic outcomes and having
children varies across different socioeconomic institutions, related policy regimes and the
gender equity levels in both public and private spheres.
Women’s Economic Activities in China during Transition
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese women
have been encouraged to join the labor market (Croll 1983). State propaganda promoted
the image of ‘Iron Girls’, which represented women who are sturdy and able to do heavy
physical work (M. Zhang and Liu 2015), and the slogan of ‘Women can hold up half the
sky’ (Honig 2000). Like the other planned economies in the former Soviet Bloc, this was
in accordance with Marx and Engles’ doctrine that women’s emancipation is contingent
on their participation in social production. Under state socialism, the work units (danwei)
in urban China helped organize social production and build facilities to support
workers—dining halls, laundries, and childcare centers—that were either free or charged
nominal fees. Birth control policies implemented in China for more than three decades
(Gu et al. 2007) also reduced women’s time commitment to family obligations and
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increased their economic activity (Wu, Ye, and He 2014). Also, because of the shrinkage
of the family size due to birth control, it is easier for families to accommodate childcare
supports from grandparents or other family members. All of these factors helped women
cope with the demands of childrearing and labor market employment.
At the height of the socialist period, women in China had some of the highest
labor force participation rates in the world (UNDP 1995, 1995). Recently, those rates
have declined and gender gap in wages has increased (Appleton, Song, and Xia 2014;
Berik, Dong, and Summerfield 2007; Chi, Li, and Yu 2011), suggesting that women’s
position in the labor market has deteriorated (Zhang et al. 2004; Wang 2005; Li and Li
2008). The worsening trend is concentrated among mothers (Zhang and Hannum 2015;
Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008).
According to the data from surveys on women’s status, among women who
experienced work interruption in non-agricultural economic activities, only about 6
percent were due to childbearing during 1970s, while this proportion increased
dramatically to 35 percent during the first decade in this century (Huang 2014). Several
events contributed to this change. In 1989, the publicly-funded child care system that
provided care to children from the earliest months until primary school stopped taking
children under 3 years of age (Du and Dong 2013). At roughly the same time, in order to
become more profitable, many urban enterprises cut subsidized childcare services for the
children of employees (Cook and Dong 2011). Further, after 1992, state-owned
enterprises became more and more privatized, causing large-scale layoffs. Women were
laid off disproportionally, and the length of unemployment was longer for women than
men (Du and Dong 2009). These changes shifted the burden of childcare back to women
44

and put them in an unfavorable position in the labor market, which was observed in other
transitional economies as well (Hunt 2002; UNICEF 1999).17
More recent studies give more weight to the traditional gendered roles within
households and the intact gendered labor division (Zuo 2012; Ji et al. 2017). At historical
junctures, Chinese women’s liberation was an integral part of nationalism, and their
equity was less of a right than an obligation. Women were expected to take on almost the
same work as men for the good of socialist production (Zuo 2012). However, even with
state services that alleviated some of women’s domestic responsibilities, women were
still obligated to do the rest of the unpaid household work, which was treated as
secondary to social production (S. Song 2012). Thus, working women, especially those
with lower incomes and less help from other family members, still suffered from the
double burden of paid and domestic work (Ji et al. 2017). Thus, traditional gender ideals
about family roles went unchallenged at home and at work even as China transitioned to
a market economy.
Further, during the market transition, the public discourse shifted from a statedominated Marxist political discourse to a market-oriented discourse. This market
discourse asserts that gendered market outcomes result from distinct abilities derived
from essential gender differences. This belief closely aligns with, and contributes to, the
continued support of traditional patriarchal norms in urban China (Sun and Chen 2015).
In post-socialist Vietnam, gender disparities in the household division of labor have
increased as a result of a resurgence in male-centered family relations (Luong 2003). This
revitalization of traditional gender values also contributes to the decline of women’s
17

After reunification, East German employment rates were sharply lowered and the unemployment was
disproportionally high among women (Rosenfeld, Trappe, and Gornick 2004). In Russia, the wage inequality between
men and women increased across all percentiles of the wage distribution between year 1991 and 1994 (Brainerd 1998).
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position in the labor market. In other more developed East Asian countries that share
patriarchal norms and Confucian ideology with China, the reduced labor force
participation of women after marriage or childbirth has long been observed. In Japan,
women tend to show similar labor force participation with men immediately after leaving
school. However, their labor force participation then decreases sharply after marriage or
childbearing and does not recover (Brinton 1989). A similar situation is also observed in
South Korea, where married women are 40-60% less likely to participate in the labor
force than unmarried women, even among college graduates (Lee, Jang, and Sarkar 2008).
In Japan where masculinity is preferred in the workplace, women are concentrated in
low-level positions (Nemoto 2013). In South Korea, a demand for long working hours
and rare part-time employment makes it hard for South Korean women to balance work
and family (Ma 2014).
Although the extant research has provided insightful discourse into the position of
women in China’s post-reform marketplace, limited research has focused on the
relationship between mothers’ decisions to join the labor force and the ages of their
children at the time. As suggested by previous studies, women’s labor market decisions
are based on their life course events (Waite 1980). Typically, western empirical studies
suggest that a small child has an inhibiting effect on mother’s work activity (Waite 1976;
Maron and Meulders 2008), and a woman who is pregnant or has preschoolers is less
likely to make voluntary job changes to increase her salary or further her career (Looze
2017). However, the negative effect of children decreases with the age of the youngest
child (Maron and Meulders 2008), and older children seem to prompt women to join the
workforce (Budig 2003). In China, the conflict between work and family is also most
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intense when children are young, and the presence of preschoolers lessens the likelihood
that a woman will join the workforce (Maurer-Fazio et al. 2011; Hare 2016). Thus, we
expect women’s labor activities will vary with the stages of their children’s growth and
independence.
Recent studies have examined women’s increasing losses in the labor market over
time. Capitalizing on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey in 1991–2011,
Hare (2016) suggested that having children under age 7 had a larger inhibiting effect on
women’s labor force participation after 2000 than before. Using the same survey data, Jia
and Dong (2012) conducted fixed-effects models and found that urban women
experienced a substantial motherhood penalty from 1999–2005 when compared to their
counterparts in 1990–1996. By interacting gender variable with year dummies, Zhang
and Hannum (2015) also observed that mothers were increasing disadvantaged in wage
earnings by the late 2000s. However, few empirical studies have directly examined how
urban women’s labor market outcomes have changed with the development of local
economy following the transition to a market-oriented economy.
To fill the gap in the literature, this chapter uses longitudinal survey data from
1991–2011 to investigate the heterogeneous relationship between urban women’s
economic activity and income with the ages and stages of their children. We also explore
these relationships in light of local economic development.
Data and Methods
This chapter uses data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), a
collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the Chinese
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Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This survey captured family changes from
1989 to 2011, the period during which China experienced rapid economic development.
The CHNS is a panel/longitudinal study of households in eight provinces (Liaoning,
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou) begun in 1989. The
survey added a ninth province (Heilongjiang) in 1997.18 This survey covers roughly half
of China’s population in provinces that are geographically diverse (Jones-Smith and
Popkin 2010). The original survey used a multi-state, random cluster design to select a
stratified probability sample. The initial primary sampling units consisted of 190
communities with substantial variations in level of economic development, including 31
urban neighborhoods, 31 suburban neighborhoods, 32 towns, and 96 rural villages. Our
study uses eight waves of surveys (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011),
excluding the 1989 wave because it included a partial sample and used questionnaires
substantially different from those in the later waves (Gong, Xu, and Han 2015).
Because the focus of this chapter is on urban women, we exclude women who
live in rural villages. Then, we confine our analysis to women ages 18–50 for any wave
observed. That is, women who joined the survey in later waves/years are also kept in the
analysis. 19 Only married women who stay in their first marriages are included,
minimizing the impact of selectivity into marriage. For the selected women, the
information about the children can be easily obtained, because the marriage and fertility
histories of all women who are ever married under 52 years old are recorded in the data. 20

18

Liaoning was unable to participate in the CHNS for 1997 wave but was added back in 2000.
In this chapter, women are included in our analytical sample once they meet the criteria. Though a balanced sample
starting from the same baseline year would be desirable, there are not enough observations. Still, we believe it is
worthwhile to use these data because of the limited number of longitudinal surveys conducted in China during this
period.
20
Childless women are also included in our analysis. However, because we only focus on married women, the
observations that are childless only account for about 2%. These observations are excluded in conditional fixed-effects
19
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Further, the data are stacked into a women-wave structure for conducting fixed-effects
models. These only use the within-individual variations, so only women with at least two
waves of observations are kept in our analytical sample. This exclusion does not
substantially affect the distribution of the observations in terms of educational levels,
sampling stratums, labor force participation, and the various ages and stages of children.
To better capture the impact of children on urban women’s economic outcomes
rather than limit the analytical sample to wage workers (Jia and Dong 2012; Yu and Xie
2014; Zhang and Hannum 2015), all women (having worked or not) are included in
analytical data. The final analytical sample has 6,374 person-wave observations for 1,933
women, 21 the size of which is similar to the analytical sample size of previous studies
using the same data source. Among them, 118 women (with 307 observations) reported
never working, 691 women (with 2,671 observations) experienced work interruption,
1,124 women (with 3,396 observations) worked during all the waves. As shown in Table
2-1, the last group is more educated than the first two groups.
TABLE 2-1 ABOUT HERE
Fixed-effects Model
Person-fixed-effects models are conducted in this study to reveal how the withinperson change in labor force participation and income (across waves) is associated with
different stages in children’s growth and independence. By only using within-person
model because of collinearity. To keep consistent, we do not include this category into our model. However, as a
robustness check, we also conduct random-effects models with the dummy variable of ‘no child’ included. The effect of
this variable is not statistically significant, which might result from the limited number of observations. We also obtain
consistent results for our main independent variables.
21
Because of the settings of conditional fixed-effects models and the selectivity that only those who stayed in the labor
force would report income, the analytical sample size for each model is different. Specifically, the full sample will only
be used for the random-effects logistic model predicting working as a robustness check in Appendix Table 2-1 and the
Heckman selection model in Appendix Table 2-2.
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variations, these fixed-effects models control for all unmeasured, unchanging
characteristics of persons that contribute additively to the estimation of their probability
of working and earning income (Allison 2009). However, fixed-effects models only
capture the relationship between different stages of children and the economic outcomes
of women who choose to be mothers. Results from random-effects models are also
included for comparison.
The conditional fixed-effects logistic regression model analyzes women’s labor
activity where

is the probability of working for woman at time :

Because the fixed-effects model uses the within-person variation, only women who have
experienced work interruption are included. As a robustness test, we also use randomeffects models with all women (Appendix Table 2-1). For women who had jobs and
reported income, the dependent variable is the logarithm of their annual income, which is
adjusted for CPI (inflated to 2009 yuan). The fixed-effects linear model is:

where

allows for different constants at different waves.

variables that varies over individuals and time.
that vary over community and over time.

is a column vector of

represents community-level variables

represents all differences between

individuals that are stable over time, a set of fixed constants that can be correlated with
other measured predictors.

is the idiosyncratic error term.

For analysis of income, we also take into account the sample selection bias that
income is observed only for women choosing to participate in the labor force (Heckman
1977; Wu and Xie 2003) by using the Heckman’s selection model (Appendix Table 2-2)
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as a robustness check.22 Results from the models that control for this selection bias are
also shown in Appendix Table 2-3.
Variables
Our main analytical outcome variables include women’s labor force participation
and the logarithm of annual income. Women’s labor activity (working or not) depends on
the reported working status.23 By defining work as income-earning activities rather than
employment for wages, we take into account any moneymaking activities and capture the
changing economic status of women more comprehensively. Women’s annual income is
taken from the CHNS which added up various income sources. Because the wage is
imputed from adjacent waves if it is missing, observations with imputed wage are not
included in our analysis to avoid bias when estimating the effects of children.
The main time-varying variables are the different stages of motherhood: having
children under 3 years old (very young children), having children ages 3–6 (young
children), having children 7–15 (school-aged children), and having children older than 15
(children at working age). Because publicly subsidized childcare centers stopped
providing services to children under 3 in 1989 (Du and Dong 2013), we categorize
having children under age 3 as the first stage of motherhood. In China, most children start
compulsory education at age 7, thus the second and third stages are split at age 7. The last
22

First, Heckman model for maximum likelihood estimates is fitted to obtain the nonselection hazard (inverse Mills
ratio). As shown in Appendix Table 2-2, inverse Mills ratio is estimated from a probit model for working. In addition to
the variables that have been included in the income model, husband’s labor force participation and the income of
household excluding women’s income are also used in the probit model to predict women’s labor force participation.
Then, the nonselection hazard is included in the fixed-effects and random-effects linear model to account for the
selection bias. For the outcome model of women’s logged income, we also try between-within method (Allison 2009)
as a robustness check. That is, we decompose the time-varying variable of different motherhood stages into timeinvariant mean/average values and time-varying deviations from those averages, and then put all of these variables into
the model. Thus, the variables of time-varying deviations can have similar interpretations as in a person-fixed-effects
model. It shows consistent results with our main analysis that having children at school age has positive impacts on
women’s income.
23
Robustness tests are conducted with women considered as working if she reported working or had positive income.
The results of the robustness tests lead to the same conclusion.
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stage starts at age 15, usually the last year that a child receives compulsory education
and/or enters the labor force. These measures capture different stages of motherhood by
the age and independence of children. While most previous research only focused on the
effects of motherhood or number of children on women’s wages (Jia and Dong 2012; Yu
and Xie 2014), our study focuses on the relationship between children and women’s
economic outcomes across the stages of motherhood. Typically, a small child depends
more on his or her mother and has an inhibiting effect on mother’s work, but the negative
effect decreases as the child becomes older, goes to school, and becomes independent.
Other time-varying variables are included in the model to control for women’s
household contexts, such as proximity of other relatives (mother and mother in-law) who
may provide child care so that a mother’s employment is not constrained. Five categories
(living in the same household, living in the same neighborhood/village, living in the same
city/county, living in other city/county, and not alive or unknown) represent different
levels of help. ‘Living in the same household’ suggests that a women has the greatest
opportunity of child care. ‘Not alive or unknown’ represents the least chance for child
care. Husband’s labor activity and household income excluding woman’s income—a
proxy for family economic resources—are included in the model of women’s labor force
participation.24 In random-effects models, we also control for women’s age, educational
level, and the sampling stratum of this survey.
To capture the community economic environments that change over time, we
employ the community-level scale created by CHNS team: economic component score
24

We do not include these two variables in the model of income. This is because we conduct Heckman selection model,
which needs different variables in the selection model and the outcome model, to account for the selection bias towards
being in the labor force as a robustness test. By excluding these two variables from the outcome model, we assume
husband’s labor activity and the income excluding woman’s income only in the selection model, we assume that these
two variables affect a woman’s probability of being in the labor force but do not directly affect her income. We also
conduct an analysis on women’s logged income with these two variables included. The results are consistent.
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(Jones-Smith and Popkin 2010). An economic component score measures economic
activity with a range of 0–10, including the typical daily wage for ordinary male workers
and the percentage of the population engaged in nonagricultural work. This information
was obtained from a community survey of area administrators and official records
(Monda et al. 2007). The increasing values of the economic component scores indicate
the development of local economies (Table 2-2).
TABLE 2-2 ABOUT HERE
Furthermore, to better control for the exogenous changes in the community, we
also include a quality of health score in the model to measure health infrastructure,
including the number and the type of health facilities and pharmacies in or near (≤ 12
kilometers) the community. We include this variable because an increase in the
availability of health facilities might represent a time-saver for mothers, especially those
with young children. Sanitation score and housing score for the community are also
included. A sanitation score is a measure of the proportion of households with treated
water and the prevalence of households without excreta present outside the house. A
housing score measures the availability of electricity, indoor tap water, flush toilets, and
gas for cooking. We include these two variables as a measure of the standard of living,
which might reduce the demand for domestic labor. Although the social services score,
which measures the provision of preschool for children under age 3 and the availability of
different kinds of insurance, is also in the CHNS, it is not included in our analysis
because it only covers waves after the year 2000.
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Results
Women’s Labor Activity
Table 2-3 shows the descriptive statistics by year from 1991 to 2011. The labor
activity of women in the sample dropped substantially from the 1990s to 2000s,
especially during the period from 2000 through 2004.25 The last four panels of Table 2-3
show the proportion of working mothers with children in different age groups: children
under age 3, children ages 3–6, children ages 7–15, and children older than age 15. As
shown, except for women who have children older than 15, the mean ages of mothers for
different motherhood stages in 1991–2011 do not differ substantially, which ensures the
comparison is less likely to be affected by mother’s age. The decline of female labor
force participation is most striking for those who have very young children. While nearly
90% of women in this group were employed in 1991, only around 55% were employed in
2004–2011. More than 90% of women with young children were in the labor force until
2000. While their numbers dropped precipitously after 2000, more than 60% remained
employed. The labor force participation of mothers with school-aged children was around
95% in 1991, and it remained high; after a drop in 2000–2004, 70% of these mothers
were in the workforce from 2006 through 2011. For women with children older than 15,
the proportion of working mothers also dropped from about 90% in 1991 to less than
60% in 2004. However, it recovered a bit after 2004 and remained higher than the rate
proportion of working women among those with very young children.

25

During this period, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and launched a drastic privatization in
socialized services, shifting the family-related responsibilities back to women (Hare 2016). However, because we do
not have balanced data, it is hard to distinguish whether the drop of women’s labor activity reflects the impact of
having children across women entering in different waves or the change of the impact of having children over time.
Thus, we further conduct statistical analyses and interact motherhoods stages with the economic component score to
see how the impact of having children changes with the development of the local economies.
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TABLE 2-3 ABOUT HERE
We conduct both conditional fixed-effects models and random-effects models of
women’s labor activity as shown in Model F1 and Model R1 of Table 2-4, respectively.
In random-effects models, we include women’s ages, sampling stratum, and educational
levels. Both of these models suggest a negative relationship between having very young
children and mothers’ labor market participation. Specifically, as suggested by
conditional fixed-effects models, the odds of working are 58.73% (

) lower for

a mother with children under 3 years of age than without children under age 3. 26 The
work interruption we found for those who gave birth after the 1990s contradicts earlier
findings that mothers in mainland China continued to work after the births of their
children (Yi and Chien 2002). The deepening reform of the state-owned enterprises after
1992 and the demise of publicly funded childcare have contributed to the unfavorable
labor market position of mothers with young children in recent decades. However, this
negative relationship disappears in other stages of motherhood. Also, the results suggest
that husband’s working status is positively associated with his wife’s. Although we do
not have a clear explanation for this association, it might be related to the dismantling of
state-owned enterprises during the economic reforms in 1990s. Before the economic
reform, it was common that household members worked in the same state-owned
enterprise (Tian and Li 2016). Thus, when the economic reforms started, wives and
husbands who worked in the state-owned enterprise privatized were likely to be laid off

26

Because about 20% of the observations have children at different age groups, we can only interpret the coefficients
as comparing to the period without children in this age group all the other stages rather than one specific reference
stage. We also conduct analyses on the impacts of different age of the youngest child on women’s economic outcomes
as robustness checks. Having youngest child older than 15 years old is the reference group because, as shown in our
main analysis, mothers’ economic activity is less likely to be affected by children older than age 15. The results are
shown in Appendix Table 2-4 and Appendix Table 2-5.
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together,27 leading to a positive relationship in our model results. As shown in Table 2-3,
the proportion of working husbands also dropped substantially between 2000 and 2004.
In Model R2 and Model F2, we include the interaction terms between different
stages of motherhood and the community-level economic component score of local
economy. As shown, all four interactions are statistically significant. Specifically, the
relationship between having very young children and mothers’ labor force participation
becomes more negative when the local economies develop. The magnitude of the positive
relationship between mothers’ labor activity and school-aged children28 becomes smaller
when the economic component scores increase.
TABLE 2-4 ABOUT HERE
Women’s Income
Further analysis on mothers’ income is conducted by using both fixed-effects and
random-effects models. 29 To account for the selection bias towards labor force
participation, we also run robustness tests by including an inverse Mills ratio generated
from a Heckman’s selection model (Appendix Table 2-2) into the main model. The
results in Appendix Table 2-3 are also consist with our findings.
Women’s income has increased since the 1990s as demonstrated by the dummies
for waves showing growing and positive coefficients in Table 2-5. Also, there is little

27

Though the official policy considered this situation and suggested not lay off both of them, there is no significant
evidence of the policy effect on the probability of being laid off (Appleton et al. 2002).
28
The main effect of having children between seven and fifteen years old is statistically significant in random-effects
model but not in fixed-effects model. This might result from the bigger standard error in fixed-effect model, because
the effect will be significant at 0.1 level if we replace the standard error from fixed-effects model (0.177) with the
standard error from random-effects model (0.125). Thus, we suggest that the relationship between women’s labor
activity and having children at school age is positive. This finding is consistent with previous literature suggesting that
Chinese women are likely to feel that it is their duty to work for the good of their children (Short et al. 2002).
29
We also include years of working (which is estimated by taking the differences between age and the approximate age
of obtaining the highest educational level) as a proxy for working experience in the random-effects models for a
robustness check. The results are consistent.
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evidence that mothers’ income is negatively related to very young children because the
coefficients of children under 3 years old are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Nevertheless, both the fixed-effects and random-effects models suggest a positive
relationship between school-aged children and mothers’ income. Specifically, mothers
tend to have 11.18% higher income if they have school-aged children than if they do not,
suggesting that, in response to the rising costs of children’s education or other needs as
children grow up, mothers are motivated to work harder or resort to alternative
moneymaking activities to increase income. This is also consistent with findings from
previous studies that families employ adaptive strategies to support the education and
wellbeing of children (F. Chen and Korinek 2010).
The interactive terms are then included in both fixed-effects and random-effects
models. Overall, the interactive terms are negative, suggesting a smaller positive
relationship between school-aged children and mothers’ income in more developed local
economies. Specifically, according to fixed-effect model, having school-aged children is
correlated with 10.5% (

) higher income of mothers when the economic

component score is at 5, which is around its mean value. But the income will be 7.2%
(

) lower for mothers with school-aged children when the economic

component score is at 10 (the highest value). Thus, there is no strong evidence that
mothers with young children earn less, but rather, they have higher incomes when their
children go to school. This positive association between mothers’ income and the
presence of school-aged children gets smaller, and even turns to a negative one, when the
local economies develop.
TABLE 2-5 ABOUT HERE
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Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter contributes to the literature on the deteriorating position of urban
Chinese mothers in the labor market by focusing on the heterogenous relationship
between different stages of motherhood and women’s economic outcomes. By applying a
fixed-effects model to the longitudinal survey data, we use only information on withinperson variation, controlling for unobserved factors that may be correlated with mothers’
economic outcomes. This study also connects the market changes to the variation of
mothers’ labor force participation by linking the relationship between children and
women’s labor force participation with local economic development.
We find that Chinese women’s labor activity declined after 1990, and that
women’s economic activities respond to the demands of her family, which vary across
different motherhood stages. The probability of working is much lower for mothers of
young children, while mothers with school-aged children are earning higher incomes than
at any other time in their careers. This corresponds with the findings from Western
studies that the ages of children and family expenses affect mothers’ decisions about
market activity (Waite 1980). When children begin school, mothers engage in adaptive
strategies, such as multiple moneymaking activities, in response to increasing expenses.
This historic trend of Chinese mothers’ labor force participation is different from
that of mothers in other industrialized societies. In this sense, our research also
complements studies that focus on gender equity and institutional changes by addressing
how labor market changes might contribute to gender inequality in the labor market as
well as in the family. Before economic reform, women were encouraged by the state to
participate in social production and they were relieved of much of their domestic work
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(especially childcare) with the help of publicly funded services. However, during the
economic transition, both the more gender-egalitarian state sectors and the statedominated Marxist political discourse retreated. Thus, in contrast to the growth of the
female labor force during periods of rapid economic development in industrialized
countries, Chinese women’s labor force participation declined. Our analysis suggests that,
for mothers in the early stages of motherhood, the inhibiting effect of very young
children is exacerbated with the development of local economies. For women who have
school-aged children, the positive association is eroded with the development of local
economies. This decline is partly because the high level of female labor force
participation before China’s economic reform has regressed to the mean level of other
market economies during plan-to-market economic style transition. This resurgence of
gender inequality in China’s labor market can also be attributed to the fact that traditional
gender-role ideologies within households that persistently dominate in East Asian regions
remained intact under state socialism (Ji et al. 2017). Women are still expected to take the
main responsibility of childrearing and household chores even when they have full-time
jobs.
Recently, there have been heated discussions about whether the 2015 government
decision to allow couples to have more than one child will result in increased fertility (Z.
Zhao 2015; Attané 2016a). Some say the change in birth control policies will not be
enough to encourage families to have more than one child; inadequate protection of
Chinese women in the labor market and the lack of state policies supporting families with
children will continue to be a deterrent (Attané 2016a).
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According to McDonald (2000), very low fertility is likely to be observed in
postindustrial societies, where women’s labor market participation is normatively
accepted but a highly gendered division of labor remains at home. We believe that
women’s conflict between work and family has only gotten worse in recent years.
Employers are not helping. They already expect women to be less devoted to their work
and more devoted to their families, even those who already have one child and are not
eligible to have a second child before the policy change. Further, the growing gender
inequities in the labor market are likely to reduce women’s power in decision making in
families, because women’s influence in family life largely depends on their relative
economic resources to their husbands.(Qian and Jin 2018). Thus, we suggest that
government policies that support families in childrearing and promote gender equality
within households should be promoted (Hu and Peng 2012; Zhao 2016; Zheng 2016).
Studies of the impacts of various policies on fertility trends in western countries have
suggested that policies which help women to combine the work and mother roles are
more likely to result in higher fertility rates (Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016;
Brauner-Otto 2016). In East Asia, a study of supportive policies found a positive impact
on family fertility in South Korea (Yoon 2017). Overall, the long-term fertility trend in
China will depend on the interactions among gender-role ideology, public policies, and
labor market institutions.
As with most studies on this topic, our research is limited in some ways. First,
living with family members, such as sisters’ or brothers’ family, who are also likely to
provide/need childcare supports might affect our results. Second, we do not have enough
childless observations to depict women’s employment/income trajectories. Third, because
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our analyses focus on women in urban areas, the results might not generalize to rural
areas, where the economic structure is different. Previous studies suggest that, in rural
China, economic development does not uniformly increase gender inequities within
households (Matthews and Nee 2000). The increasing rural-urban migration will also
affect women’s childbearing (Guo 2010; Xu 2016).
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Tables
Table 2-1 Descriptive statistics of analytical sample by different working experience
Women who

Women who

Women who have

have never

experienced work

been working for

worked

interruption

all waves

(n=118)

(n=691)

(n=1,124)

Age at first wave/Std.Dev

34.51/7.81

32.48/6.30

34.83/6.82

Mean age/Std.Dev

37.28/7.70

37.93/7.07

38.09/6.86

Primary school or lower

14.41

22.43

23.40

Middle school

52.54

43.85

28.11

High school

27.12

23.88

19.48

College or above

5.93

9.84

29.00

Cities

27.12

22.58

29.45

Suburban neighborhoods

40.68

41.68

35.94

Towns or county capital cities

32.20

35.75

34.61

Highest education level (%)

Stratum (%)
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Table 2-2 Value of economic component score of communities by year
Wave

1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2007 2009 2011

Mean

3.96

4.11

5.70

6.74

7.70

8.13

8.65

8.72

Std.Dev

1.63

1.42

3.14

2.92

3.05

2.75

2.64

2.60
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Table 2-3 Descriptive statistics by year
Year
Number of observations
Age
Proportion of working
women
Income of working
women
Logarithm of income
Highest educational
level
Primary school or
lower
Middle school

1991

1993

1997

2000

2004

2006

2009

2011

859

865

913

914

801

778

689

555

34.46

36.26

36.95

38.24

38.90

39.66

40.17

41.03

92. 43%

92.83%

86.53%

77.90%

62.80%

64.91%

66.04%

72.61%

4075

5044

6514

8314

10990

12662

17426

18758

8.1

8.3

8.5

8.8

9.0

9.2

9.5

9.6

34.23%

33.76%

29.46%

20.68%

15.23%

12.47%

9.58%

9.37%

33.41%

32.95%

32.53%

34.35%

36.95%

38.69%

38.17%

39.46%

High school

22.00%

22.31%

21.58%

23.96%

23.97%

23.52%

20.75%

18.38%

College or above

10.36%

10.98%

16.43%

21.01%

23.85%

25.32%

31.49%

32.79%

City

25.15%

26.47%

27.60%

25.82%

23.35%

23.26%

22.06%

23.60%

Suburban

38.77%

36.30%

41.95%

40.37%

43.45%

42.67%

41.80%

40.72%

36.09%

37.23%

30.45%

33.81%

33.21%

34.06%

36.14%

35.68%

98.84%

98.38%

96.17%

91.25%

80.52%

81.23%

81.86%

86.13%

9.0

9.0

9.2

9.3

9.6

9.5

9.9

10.1

3.96%

3.12%

2.19%

3.17%

2.37%

2.57%

2.90%

3.06%

16.76%

14.45%

13.69%

15.65%

11.99%

13.11%

11.32%

11.71%

42.02%

42.77%

46.11%

47.16%

48.69%

47.04%

49.78%

45.77%

15.60%

14.34%

13.14%

11.60%

13.23%

13.11%

12.19%

11.35%

21.65%

25.32%

24.86%

22.43%

23.72%

24.16%

23.80%

28.11%

24.33%

25.78%

23.66%

21.99%

21.97%

21.21%

22.06%

24.68%

25.15%

23.47%

20.92%

24.29%

27.84%

24.29%

21.04%

20.18%

13.50%

13.41%

18.51%

17.83%

15.61%

15.81%

23.37%

19.81%

7.22%

6.94%

6.68%

6.13%

4.74%

5.66%

3.48%

4.86%

29.80%

30.30%

30.23%

29.76%

29.84%

33.03%

30.04%

30.45%

87

96

71

64

53

41

33

27.93

27.89

27.73

27.90

28.98

29.70

30.23

31.03

88.67%

87.36%

88.54%

70.42%

53.13%

56.60%

56.10%

54.55%

3483

3811

5327

7696

9994

13563

16933

17122

Stratum

Town or county
capital city
Proportion of working
husband
Logarithm of household
income excluding
women’s income
Living status of mother
Living in the same
household
Living in the same
neighborhood/village
Living in the same
city/county
Living in other
city/county
Not alive or unknown
Living status of mother
in law
Living in the same
household
Living in the same
neighborhood/village
Living in the same
city/county
Living in other
city/county
Not alive or unknown

Women who have children under age 3
Number of observations
150
Age
Proportion of working
women
Income of working
women

64

Logarithm of income

7.9

7.8

Women who have children between age 3 and 6
Number of observations
290
254
Age
Proportion of working
women
Income of working
women
Logarithm of income

8.2

8.6

8.7

9.4

9.4

9.6

141

108

93

84

88

53

30.88

31.51

31.04

30.48

31.72

31.97

33.44

32.80

92.76%

90.94%

92.20%

86.11%

67.74%

60.71%

61.36%

75.47%

3623

4716

5949

7844

10668

14944

18251

20187

8.0

8.2

8.4

8.7

8.9

9.4

9.5

9.7

Women who have children between age 7 and 15
Number of observations
475
515

522

476

340

283

284

197

36.93

37.00

37.13

37.68

37.60

37.44

38.24

38.23

94.74%

92.82%

88.89%

80.04%

64.61%

69.26%

71.19%

75.13%

4229

5202

6755

8512

10667

12079

16813

18115

8.1

8.3

8.5

8.8

9.0

9.1

9.5

9.6

Women who have children older than age 15
Number of observations
262
282

373

428

455

459

403

336

Age
Proportion of working
women
Income of working
women
Logarithm of income

Age
Proportion of working
women
Income of working
women
Logarithm of income

38.53

41.60

41.52

42.88

42.67

43.32

43.95

45.05

90.08%

93.62%

81.77%

74.30%

57.80%

59.69%

60.05%

69.64%

4358

5557

6725

7852

10623

11798

17259

18218

8.1

8.3

8.5

8.6

9.0

9.0

9.6

9.6
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Table 2-4 Coefficients of logistic model predicting working (Reference group: not working)
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Random-effects Model
Model R1
Model R2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
Children under 3 years old
-0.742***
0.193
-0.704***
0.198
*economic component score
-0.119*
0.057
Children between 3 and 6 years old
-0.033
0.158
0.019
0.164
*economic component score
-0.098*
0.047
Children between 7 and 15 years old
0.342**
0.125
0.416**
0.132
*economic component score
-0.109**
0.039
Children older than 15 years old
0.082
0.146
0.127
0.152
*economic component score
-0.107**
0.041
Age
-0.040***
0.011
-0.040***
0.011
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.262*
0.132
0.268*
0.134
**
High school
0.458
0.148
0.448**
0.149
College or above
0.612**
0.208
0.552**
0.209
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.291+
0.150
0.311*
0.150
Town or county capital city
-0.053
0.144
-0.005
0.144
Working status of husband (ref: not
***
***
1.994
0.168
1.982
0.168
working)
Income of household excluding
-0.210***
0.035
-0.212***
0.035
women’s income
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.134
0.306
0.157
0.305
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
0.130
0.291
0.154
0.290
Living in other city/county
-0.086
0.311
-0.070
0.310
Not alive or unknown
-0.024
0.301
-0.000
0.300
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
-0.155
0.140
-0.172
0.141
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
-0.435**
0.163
-0.458**
0.164
Living in other city/county
-0.237
0.245
-0.244
0.244
Not alive or unknown
-0.356*
0.143
-0.376**
0.143

Conditional fixed-effects Model
Model F1
Model F2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
-0.885**
0.279
-0.929***
-0.207**
-0.161
0.209
-0.172
-0.167**
0.233
0.177
0.302+
-0.176**
-0.096
0.197
-0.170
-0.127*

S.E.
0.270
0.071
0.204
0.065
0.167
0.056
0.202
0.062

2.054***

0.258

2.069***

0.262

-0.201***

0.045

-0.211***

0.046

0.342

0.517

0.454

0.522

0.039
-0.073
-0.219

0.458
0.510
0.466

0.150
0.042
-0.139

0.462
0.515
0.468

-0.356

0.243

-0.400+

0.234

-0.630**
-0.144
-0.362

0.231
0.415
0.277

-0.654**
-0.157
-0.419

0.225
0.404
0.270
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Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.042*
0.021
0.086+
0.046
-0.009
0.033
0.174*
0.069
**
**
**
Quality of health score
0.073
0.024
0.070
0.024
0.081
0.025
0.077**
0.025
Sanitation score
-0.075*
0.030
-0.065*
0.030
-0.072
0.061
-0.068
0.060
Housing component score
0.048
0.035
0.050
0.035
-0.020
0.081
-0.002
0.080
Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
Year 1993
-0.076
0.232
-0.071
0.233
-0.057
0.232
-0.035
0.235
Year 1997
-0.649**
0.219
-0.630**
0.223
-0.856**
0.265
-0.784**
0.273
Year 2000
-1.204***
0.224
-1.181***
0.227
-1.583***
0.345
-1.486***
0.355
Year 2004
-1.725***
0.238
-1.702***
0.240
-2.372***
0.388
-2.302***
0.400
Year 2006
-1.434***
0.244
-1.416***
0.246
-2.221***
0.403
-2.153***
0.416
Year 2009
-1.418***
0.260
-1.409***
0.262
-2.277***
0.455
-2.234***
0.467
Year 2011
-0.843**
0.270
-0.829**
0.272
-1.812***
0.480
-1.753***
0.491
Number of observations
2671
2671
2671
2671
Note: Only women who experienced work interruption are included because of the settings of conditional fixed-effects logistic model. For a
robustness check, random-effects logistic model is conducted (Appendix Table 2-1).
Economic component score measures community-level economic activity with a range between 0 and 10, including typical daily wage for
ordinary male workers and percentage of the population engaged in nonagricultural work. The variable is centered at 5.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 2-5 Coefficients of linear model of women’s logged income
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Random-effects Model
Model R3
Model R4
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
Children under 3 years old
-0.067
0.045
-0.082+
0.046
*economic component score
-0.010
0.013
Children between 3 and 6 years old
0.042
0.036
0.020
0.036
*economic component score
-0.014
0.010
Children between 7 and 15 years old
0.111***
0.030
0.119***
0.031
*economic component score
-0.040***
0.009
Children older than 15 years old
0.016
0.035
-0.010
0.035
*economic component score
-0.012
0.010
Age
0.010***
0.003
0.010***
0.003
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.078*
0.038
0.074*
0.038
**
High school
0.132
0.042
0.126**
0.042
College or above
0.437***
0.049
0.421***
0.049
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.076
0.070
0.074
0.070
Town or county capital city
-0.070
0.066
-0.062
0.066
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.106
0.073
0.101
0.073
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
0.030
0.069
0.027
0.069
Living in other city/county
0.054
0.073
0.050
0.073
Not alive or unknown
0.029
0.071
0.027
0.071
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.028
0.035
0.024
0.034
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
-0.031
0.039
-0.035
0.039
Living in other city/county
-0.058
0.054
-0.059
0.054
Not alive or unknown
-0.039
0.035
-0.043
0.035
Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.003
0.006
0.024*
0.011
*
Quality of health score
-0.015
0.006
-0.017**
0.006
Sanitation score
0.027**
0.009
0.027**
0.009

Fixed-effects Model
Model F3
Model F4
Coefficients S.E.
Coefficients
-0.054
0.054
-0.094
-0.025+
0.059
0.047
0.021
-0.020
0.106**
0.038
0.100*
-0.035**
0.009
0.048
-0.035
-0.005

S.E.
0.059
0.014
0.049
0.014
0.040
0.012
0.052
0.012

0.053

0.121

0.062

0.121

-0.033
0.043
-0.010

0.110
0.124
0.108

-0.022
0.053
0.006

0.111
0.125
0.109

0.121+

0.063

0.113+

0.063

0.007
0.020
-0.059

0.070
0.085
0.061

0.003
0.020
-0.065

0.070
0.083
0.060

-0.008
-0.012
-0.006

0.010
0.010
0.019

0.014
-0.014
-0.005

0.014
0.010
0.018

Housing component score
0.040***
Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
Year 1993
0.112**
Year 1997
0.271***
Year 2000
0.459***
Year 2004
0.656***
Year 2006
0.780***
Year 2009
1.153***
Year 2011
1.247***
Number of observations
4965
Note: All models are not adjusted for employment selection
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.010

0.044***

0.010

0.005

0.026

0.012

0.026

0.035
0.041
0.046
0.054
0.056
0.060
0.063

0.111**
0.271***
0.460***
0.652***
0.773***
1.142***
1.236***
4965

0.035
0.041
0.046
0.054
0.056
0.060
0.063

0.158**
0.468***
0.697***
0.970***
1.150***
1.616***
1.781***
4965

0.047
0.080
0.113
0.131
0.124
0.134
0.141

0.156**
0.466***
0.694***
0.956***
1.134***
1.586***
1.744***
4965

0.047
0.079
0.112
0.130
0.124
0.135
0.142
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Appendix
Appendix Table 2-1 Coefficients of random-effects logistic model predicting
working (Reference group: not working)
Model 1
Coefficients S.E.
-0.980***
0.197

Children under 3 years old
*economic component score
Children between 3 and 6 years old
-0.314+
*economic component score
Children between 7 and 15 years old
0.063
*economic component score
Children older than 15 years old
-0.374*
*economic component score
Age
0.014
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.283+
High school
0.710***
College or above
2.756***
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.387
Town or county capital city
-0.058
Working status of husband (ref: not working)
2.187***
Income of household excluding women’s income
-0.254***
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same neighborhood/village
-0.004
Living in the same city/county
0.061
Living in other city/county
-0.145
Not alive or unknown
-0.173
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same neighborhood/village
-0.381*
Living in the same city/county
-0.627***
Living in other city/county
-0.339
Not alive or unknown
-0.431**
Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.020
Quality of health score
0.082**
Sanitation score
-0.092*
Housing component score
0.013
Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
Year 1993
-0.069
Year 1997
-1.036***
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0.166
0.132
0.155
0.012

Model 2
Coefficients
-0.926***
-0.135*
-0.261
-0.128**
0.164
-0.139***
-0.324*
-0.127**
0.015

S.E.
0.205
0.055
0.173
0.048
0.140
0.039
0.162
0.042
0.012

0.165
0.188
0.245

0.290+
0.705***
2.715***

0.167
0.189
0.246

0.275
0.260
0.154
0.036

0.407
-0.004
2.194***
-0.259***

0.273
0.258
0.155
0.036

0.335
0.318
0.338
0.325

0.010
0.085
-0.123
-0.153

0.335
0.318
0.338
0.325

0.158
0.179
0.259
0.158

-0.388*
-0.644***
-0.336
-0.447**

0.159
0.180
0.260
0.159

0.023
0.025
0.039
0.046

0.134**
0.076**
-0.088*
0.027

0.047
0.025
0.040
0.046

0.216
0.223

-0.058
-1.012***

0.216
0.225

Year 2000
-1.841***
0.237
-1.813***
0.239
***
***
Year 2004
-2.612
0.258
-2.599
0.259
***
***
Year 2006
-2.483
0.270
-2.483
0.272
Year 2009
-2.558***
0.290
-2.565***
0.291
***
***
Year 2011
-2.117
0.304
-2.115
0.305
Number of observations
6374
6374
Note: All women are included. Though the coefficient of having children older than age 15 is negative,
we are conservative about interpreting it as imposing negative impacts on women’s probability of
working, because random-effects model also uses between-person variation/differences.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix Table 2-2 Coefficients of Heckman selection model (between-within
method)
Outcome model of women’s logged income

Coefficients

S.E.

Deviations
Children under 3 years old

-0.078

0.062

Children between 3 and 6 years old

0.032

0.058

Children between 7 and 15 years old

0.125*

0.053

Children older than 15 years old

0.037

0.056

Children under 3 years old

-0.131

0.095

Children between 3 and 6 years old

-0.000

0.064

Children between 7 and 15 years old

0.063

0.047

Averages

Children older than 15 years old

-0.015

Age

0.008

0.053
**

0.003

Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school

0.032

0.045
+

High school

0.092

0.049

College or above

0.425***

0.053

0.217***

0.035

Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
Town or county capital city

-0.030

0.031

0.042

0.086

-0.049

0.081

0.002

0.088

-0.041

0.084

Living in the same neighborhood/village

-0.011

0.038

Living in the same city/county

-0.026

0.035

Living in other city/county

-0.084

0.056

Not alive or unknown

-0.047

0.036

Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
Living in other city/county
Not alive or unknown
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same
household)

Community-level variables
0.013*

Economic component score
Quality of health score

-0.011
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0.006
0.007

Sanitation score
Housing component score

0.055***

0.008

***

0.008

0.047

Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
0.099**

Year 1993

0.033

Year 1997

0.204

***

0.040

Year 2000

0.362***

0.045

Year 2004

0.509

***

0.055

Year 2006

0.624***

0.056

Year 2009

0.970

***

0.058

Year 2011

1.029***

0.060

Children under 3 years old

-0.400***

0.089

Children between 3 and 6 years old

-0.125+

0.070

Children between 7 and 15 years old

0.014

0.058

Selection model of probability of working (probit model)

-0.229**

Children older than 15 years old
Age

0.011

*

0.069
0.005

Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school

0.042

High school

0.190*

College or above

1.097

0.070
***

0.083
0.106

Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban

0.151*

0.074

Town or county capital city

0.028

0.072
***

0.074

-0.140***

0.020

Living in the same neighborhood/village

-0.235

0.157

Living in the same city/county

-0.121

0.147

Living in other city/county

-0.245

0.159

Not alive or unknown

-0.244

0.151

Living in the same neighborhood/village

-0.294***

0.071

Living in the same city/county

-0.298***

0.078

Working status of husband (ref: not working)
Income of household excluding women’s income

1.091

Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)

Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same
household)

Living in other city/county

-0.285
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**

0.110

Not alive or unknown

-0.304***

0.072

-0.028**

0.010

0.025*

0.011

Community-level variables
Economic component score
Quality of health score
Sanitation score

-0.054

***

0.032+

Housing component score

0.014
0.016

Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
Year 1993

-0.008

0.082

Year 1997

-0.401

***

0.086

Year 2000

-0.702***

0.091

Year 2004

-1.034

***

0.096

Year 2006

-0.972***

0.101

Year 2009

-0.980

***

0.108

Year 2011

-0.789***

0.111

Number of observations

6374

Note: All women are included with clustering at individual level. Lambda is 0.056 with standard error
equaling to 0.039. The Wald test of independent equations shows that
, with p-value at
0.1452. These statistics suggest that there is no strong evidence of selection bias.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix Table 2-3 Coefficients of linear model of women’s logged income
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Random-effects Model
Model R3
Model R4
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
Children under 3 years old
-0.082+
0.047
-0.095*
0.047
*economic component score
-0.011
0.013
Children between 3 and 6 years old
0.039
0.036
0.017
0.036
*economic component score
-0.014
0.010
Children between 7 and 15 years old
0.114***
0.030
0.121***
0.031
*economic component score
-0.039***
0.009
Children older than 15 years old
0.009
0.035
-0.016
0.036
*economic component score
-0.012
0.010
Age
0.011***
0.003
0.010***
0.003
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.078*
0.038
0.074*
0.038
**
High school
0.137
0.042
0.130**
0.042
College or above
0.474***
0.056
0.453***
0.056
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.079
0.070
0.077
0.070
Town or county capital city
-0.069
0.066
-0.061
0.066
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.099
0.073
0.095
0.073
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
0.026
0.069
0.024
0.069
Living in other city/county
0.046
0.074
0.043
0.073
Not alive or unknown
0.021
0.071
0.021
0.071
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.020
0.035
0.017
0.035
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
-0.039
0.040
-0.042
0.040
Living in other city/county
-0.066
0.055
-0.066
0.055
Not alive or unknown
-0.049
0.035
-0.051
0.035
Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.004
0.006
0.023*
0.011
*
Quality of health score
-0.014
0.006
-0.016*
0.006

Fixed-effects Model
Model F3
Model F4
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
-0.055
0.059
-0.091
-0.025+
0.059
0.047
0.022
-0.020
0.106**
0.037
0.099*
-0.035**
0.009
0.049
-0.034
-0.005

S.E.
0.064
0.014
0.049
0.014
0.040
0.012
0.052
0.012

0.052

0.120

0.063

0.120

-0.033
0.043
-0.011

0.109
0.123
0.107

-0.022
0.054
0.007

0.111
0.124
0.108

0.121+

0.065

0.114+

0.065

0.006
0.020
-0.060

0.072
0.084
0.062

0.005
0.022
-0.063

0.071
0.082
0.061

-0.008
-0.012

0.010
0.010

0.015
-0.015

0.014
0.010

Sanitation score
0.025**
0.009
0.026**
0.009
-0.006
0.018
-0.005
0.018
***
Housing component score
0.040
0.010
0.044***
0.010
0.005
0.026
0.012
0.026
Dummies for wave (ref: year 1991)
Year 1993
0.111**
0.035
0.110**
0.035
0.158**
0.047
0.156**
0.047
***
***
***
Year 1997
0.260
0.042
0.261
0.042
0.468
0.080
0.467***
0.079
Year 2000
0.435***
0.049
0.440***
0.049
0.696***
0.117
0.697***
0.115
Year 2004
0.613***
0.062
0.615***
0.062
0.968***
0.144
0.962***
0.142
Year 2006
0.741***
0.063
0.740***
0.063
1.148***
0.135
1.139***
0.133
Year 2009
1.114***
0.067
1.108***
0.067
1.615***
0.142
1.591***
0.142
Year 2011
1.215***
0.067
1.209***
0.067
1.779***
0.146
1.748***
0.146
Inverse Mills ratio
0.109
0.079
0.093
0.079
0.006
0.119
-0.018
0.118
Number of observations
4965
4965
4965
4965
Note: All models are adjusted for employment selection (by including inverse Mills ratio estimated from Heckman two-step selection model
show in Appendix Table 2-2)
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix Table 2-4 Coefficients of logistic model predicting working (Reference group: not working)

77

Random-effects Model
Model R1
Model R2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
Age of youngest child (ref: older than 15 years old)
Under 3 years old
-0.763***
0.230
-0.689**
0.236
*economic component score
-0.066
0.054
Between 3 and 6 years old
-0.053
0.192
0.020
0.202
*economic component score
-0.037
0.047
Between 7 and 15 years old
0.251*
0.123
0.319*
0.137
*economic component score
-0.033
0.033
Age
-0.039***
0.011
-0.040***
0.011
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.261*
0.132
0.244+
0.133
**
High school
0.446
0.148
0.428**
0.148
College or above
0.588**
0.208
0.583**
0.208
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.307*
0.150
0.307*
0.150
Town or county capital city
-0.031
0.143
-0.026
0.144
Working status of husband (ref:
1.999***
0.168
1.993***
0.168
not working)
Income of household excluding
-0.214***
0.035
-0.214***
0.035
women’s income
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.118
0.306
0.124
0.306
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
0.130
0.291
0.138
0.291
Living in other city/county
-0.082
0.311
-0.083
0.311
Not alive or unknown
-0.011
0.300
-0.003
0.301
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
-0.151
0.140
-0.155
0.141
neighborhood/village
Living in the same city/county
-0.427**
0.163
-0.426**
0.163
Living in other city/county
-0.243
0.245
-0.241
0.245
Not alive or unknown
-0.354*
0.143
-0.356*
0.143

Conditional fixed-effects Model
Model F1
Model F2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
-0.884**

0.291

-0.717*
-0.136*
0.073
-0.086
0.390*
-0.073*

-0.109

0.244

0.217

0.156

2.057***

0.258

2.054***

0.260

-0.203***

0.044

-0.206***

0.044

0.301
0.067
0.267
0.064
0.169
0.032

0.349

0.514

0.401

0.522

0.044
-0.063
-0.202

0.456
0.506
0.465

0.088
-0.022
-0.160

0.462
0.511
0.470

-0.326

0.242

-0.330

0.234

-0.593*
-0.124
-0.343

0.231
0.415
0.279

-0.581**
-0.151
-0.345

0.225
0.413
0.273

Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.043*
0.021
-0.020
Quality of health score
0.072**
0.024
0.070**
**
Sanitation score
-0.079
0.030
-0.076*
Housing component score
0.047
0.035
0.048
Dummies for wave (ref: year
1991)
Year 1993
-0.037
0.231
-0.024
Year 1997
-0.628**
0.218
-0.591**
***
Year 2000
-1.196
0.223
-1.154***
***
Year 2004
-1.709
0.237
-1.669***
***
Year 2006
-1.423
0.243
-1.381***
***
Year 2009
-1.405
0.259
-1.372***
**
Year 2011
-0.847
0.269
-0.805**
Number of observations
2671
2671
Note: Motherhood stages are differentiated based on the age of the youngest child.
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.028
0.024
0.030
0.035

-0.010
0.080**
-0.071
-0.012

0.032
0.025
0.061
0.080

0.038
0.074**
-0.066
0.001

0.036
0.024
0.060
0.080

0.231
0.221
0.226
0.239
0.245
0.262
0.271

-0.039
-0.877***
-1.637***
-2.453***
-2.314***
-2.391***
-1.941***
2671

0.230
0.259
0.344
0.393
0.400
0.461
0.486

-0.020
-0.810**
-1.551***
-2.390***
-2.243***
-2.342***
-1.881***
2671

0.233
0.267
0.357
0.405
0.414
0.470
0.495
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Appendix Table 2-5 Coefficients of linear model of women’s logged income
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Random-effects Model
Model R1
Model R2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
Age of youngest child (ref: older than 15 years old)
Under 3 years old
-0.048
0.054
-0.011
*economic component score
-0.015
Between 3 and 6 years old
0.051
0.043
0.090*
*economic component score
-0.023*
***
Between 7 and 15 years old
0.103
0.029
0.153***
*economic component score
-0.035***
***
Age
0.011
0.003
0.011***
Highest education level (ref: Primary school or lower)
Middle school
0.079*
0.038
0.071+
**
High school
0.134
0.042
0.123**
***
College or above
0.436
0.049
0.427***
Stratum (ref: city)
Suburban
0.085
0.070
0.086
Town or county capital city
-0.064
0.065
-0.061
Living status of mother (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.109
0.073
0.107
neighborhood/village
Living in the same
0.033
0.069
0.031
city/county
Living in other city/county
0.059
0.073
0.054
Not alive or unknown
0.032
0.071
0.028
Living status of mother in law (ref: Living in the same household)
Living in the same
0.032
0.034
0.029
neighborhood/village
Living in the same
-0.029
0.039
-0.030
city/county
Living in other city/county
-0.053
0.054
-0.054
Not alive or unknown
-0.037
0.034
-0.039
Community-level variables
Economic component score
-0.002
0.006
0.017*

S.E.
0.054
0.013
0.044
0.010
0.031
0.008
0.003

Fixed-effects Model
Model F1
Model F2
Coefficients
S.E.
Coefficients
S.E.
-0.082

0.067

-0.043
-0.033*
0.069
-0.027+
0.118*
-0.031*

0.067
0.016
0.055
0.015
0.046
0.012

0.024

0.056

0.068

0.041

0.073

0.054

0.122

0.063

0.122

0.069

-0.031

0.110

-0.022

0.112

0.073
0.071

0.044
-0.013

0.124
0.109

0.051
-0.001

0.126
0.110

0.038
0.042
0.049
0.070
0.065

0.034

0.127*

0.064

0.123+

0.064

0.039

0.012

0.070

0.010

0.070

0.054
0.034

0.026
-0.059

0.085
0.062

0.027
-0.064

0.083
0.061

0.007

-0.007

0.010

0.011

0.013
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Quality of health score
-0.015*
0.006
-0.016**
0.006
-0.012
0.010
-0.014
0.010
**
Sanitation score
0.027
0.009
0.027**
0.009
-0.006
0.019
-0.005
0.018
Housing component score
0.038***
0.010
0.042***
0.010
0.005
0.026
0.012
0.027
Dummies for wave (ref: year
1991)
Year 1993
0.111**
0.035
0.112**
0.035
0.154**
0.048
0.156**
0.048
***
***
***
Year 1997
0.266
0.041
0.271
0.041
0.448
0.081
0.454***
0.080
Year 2000
0.449***
0.046
0.455***
0.046
0.666***
0.115
0.674***
0.114
Year 2004
0.648***
0.054
0.651***
0.054
0.930***
0.133
0.934***
0.134
Year 2006
0.770***
0.056
0.773***
0.056
1.108***
0.126
1.112***
0.127
Year 2009
1.145***
0.060
1.142***
0.060
1.570***
0.138
1.563***
0.140
Year 2011
1.239***
0.063
1.234***
0.063
1.732***
0.144
1.719***
0.146
Number of observations
4965
4965
4965
4965
Note: Motherhood stages are differentiated based on the age of the youngest child. Though the coefficient of having the youngest child between
age 7 and 15 is not significant in fixed-effects model, it might result from the bigger standard error in fixed-effect model. The effect will be
significant at 0.05 level if we replace the standard error from fixed-effects model (0.041) with the standard error from random-effects model
(0.029).
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

CHAPTER 3 : Between Tradition and Modernity: the Driving Force
of Chinese Fertility

Introduction
Based on the observation of heightened couple instability and very low fertility
over the second half of the 20th century in developed countries, both New Home
Economics and Second Demographic Transition theories depict less-family and lowfertility societies across the world (Becker 1991; Lesthaeghe 2010). However, recent
evidence in developed societies suggests that this depiction is possibly invalid. First,
macro-level evidence shows a positive relationship between fertility and development,
and even a positive association between fertility and women’s labor force participation,
in advanced societies (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). Second, at the micro level, a
growing body of literature suggests that the propensity to have children is higher among
the highly educated (Testa 2014).
With respect to these historical dynamics, Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015)
further depicted a U-shape curve between fertility rate and gender equity. That is, fertility
tends to be high when gender equity is low (i.e. the traditional male breadwinner-female
housekeeper model is dominant) and high (i.e. gender egalitarianism is dominant). The
lowest fertility level occurs when there is an ongoing ‘female (or gender) revolution’ in a
society. Nevertheless, most studies focus on the changes in the family system in
developed societies during post-demographic transition period, while developing
countries remain less studied. As increasing number of less developed societies are
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experiencing below replacement fertility and have completed demographic transition,
family change has emerged as a global phenomenon (Pesando et al. 2018). By using
census data in 1991, 2000 and 2010 in Brazil, one recent study on the relationship
between gender equality and women’s probability of having children found that a
reversal trend (Castanheira and Kohler 2017). That is, the gender equality index was
negatively associated with giving birth in 1991, while this association turned to positive
in 2000 and 2010. In this chapter, I suggest that this depiction might have important
implications for the relationship between fertility intentions and gender equity in
contemporary China.
As revealed by previous studies, contemporary China is markedly distinctive from
Western societies, or even its Eastern Asian neighbors, in terms of demographic and
political structural trends (Raymo et al. 2015; Yeung and Hu 2016). Strict birth control
policies starting in 1980 largely spearheaded Chinese fertility decline and thus the
demographic transition (Feeney and Wang 1993), while current low fertility is also a
result of ongoing socioeconomic, political and cultural changes (Cai 2010; Z. Zhao, Xu,
and Yuan 2017). With more families shifting from resisting to embracing the ‘small
family’ ideal (Merli and Smith 2002; H. Zhang 2007), the interrelations of gender-role
ideology, institutional arrangements, and policy support toward families start to play a
decisive role in determining long-term fertility trends (Attané 2016b; M. Zhao 2016).
Second, the evolution of the marriage and family institution in China involves the
socialist heritage, the influx of Western values, and the resurgence of Confucian tradition,
which lead to a modern-traditional mosaic temporality that differs from the family modes
in Western contexts (Ji 2017).
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Our theoretical framework for understanding the variation in the association
between gender egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions draws upon the work of both
New Home Economics and the gender equity theory in relation to fertility. The former
pays particular attention to the impact of women’s growing opportunity costs of having
children on fertility (Becker 1991), while the latter emphasizes tensions between high
levels of gender equity in individual institutions and low levels of gender equity in
family-oriented institutions (McDonald 2000). Specifically, with rapid development and
growing regional disparities in contemporary China, we propose that implications from
the early promotion of gender equity and the recent deterioration of women’s labor
market position are different for various subgroups. Among the ’traditional’ group, which
usually consists of those who are less educated and negatively affected by women’s
worsening position in the labor market during the economic transition, those who have
higher gender equity attitudes are more likely to have perceptions of unfairness. However,
for the ’modern’ subgroup, not only has first stage of the ‘gender revolution’
(Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015) – growth of female educational
attainment and labor force participation – been achieved, but also the second stage – men
join women in the private sphere of the family – has been promoted (Mu and Xie 2016,
201). Thus, we suggest that the disparities in gender-role attitudes and perceptions about
unfairness among subgroups will lead to a U-shaped relationship between gender equity
and fertility intentions in China. That is, women with high and low gender equity
attitudes will tend to show higher fertility intentions.
This chapter enhances the perspectives of earlier work in at several ways. First,
we situate the Chinese context in the ongoing discussion about gendered fertility theory
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in Western societies. Specifically, we examine the non-linear relationship between
different attitudes towards gender egalitarianism and fertility intentions. Second, we go
beyond taking the time performing housework or childcare as a proxy for gender equity
within heterosexual marriages. Instead, we develop a latent variable measuring
egalitarian gender-role attitudes and connect it to people’s fertility intentions, enriching
the growing theoretical discussions on the association between gender equity and fertility.
Further, studying gender-role ideology might also help our understanding in fertility
decisions and fertility trends in the future. For a woman with more traditional gender-role
ideology, her reported fertility intention might be more likely to reflect her husband’s
intention, as she is more subject to male dominance (Qian and Jin 2018). However, for a
woman with modern gender ideology, she is more likely report her own ideas because of
greater autonomy. In this sense, under the assumption that more gender equity is
expected with development, fertility intentions reported by women with modern genderrole ideology have more important implications for projecting future fertility trends.
We first sketch existing theories and research, coming to a deeper understanding
of the process that links gender equity and fertility. Within this section, we also highlight
relevant demographic changes in the marriage market, such as a reversal of the gender
gap in education and its implication for family outcomes. Then we introduce Chinese
contexts to draw hypotheses about the relationship between gender-role ideology and
fertility intentions. This is followed by a description of the data and methods used in this
chapter, and a presentation of the main results. We conclude with a reflection on our
findings and pay particular attention to future policy directives related to Chinese fertility
trends.
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Gender Equity and Fertility
Gender equity, rather than classical explanations that focus on the economic
reasons behind childbearing decisions (such as opportunity costs, economic uncertainty,
quantity-quality trade-off of having children etc.), has been embraced by demographers
to explain the variation of fertility across developed societies (McDonald 2000). The
expansion of education (especially for women) and the birth of modern labor economics
have transitioned women into active participants in economic production (Goldin 2006).
The development of household labor-saving technology has further facilitated this
transition. Using time diary data collected from people between 25 and 49 years old in
the United Kingdom and the United States between 1961 and 1985, Gershuny and
Robinson (1988) found that domestic work time has been declining for women. However,
with power in modern societies increasingly determined by labor market positions, the
relative success that women have gained in the public sector has not yet translated into
the private sector. The retained gender division within households results in the
increasing pressure for women to bear the brunt of conflicts between the demands of
domestic work and labor market work. As suggested by some scholars, the change of
women’s economic role is only one of the two stages in a ‘gender revolution’, and low
fertility is the reaction of women’s perception of unfairness and a reflection of the
incompleteness of the gender revolution (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015).
The second stage of the ‘gender revolution’ involves men’s participation in the
domestic sphere that propels higher levels of within-household gender equity, driving the
upward trend of fertility in more developed societies. Taking gender division of
housework as a proxy for within-household gender equality, which is often used as a
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surrogate for gender equity, a growing number of empirical studies support gender equity
theory about fertility. Using European Community Household Survey data for Italy and
Spain, where the traditional male breadwinner model is prevalent, Cooke (2003)
concluded that fathers’ greater contribution in childcare activities for the first child
facilitates the transition to the second child among dual-earner families. According to
Austrian data, even for men, those with an egalitarian attitude in gender issues show
higher intentions for a(nother) child than those living in traditional partnerships (TaziPreve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon 2004).
Changes in public policies and traditions might also push the gender revolution
and thus drive up fertility (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). European countries with
institutional arrangements and related policies that promote gender equity and help
women better balance work and family tend to see a recovery of fertility (Rindfuss, Choe,
and Brauner-Otto 2016). Comparing Hungary with Sweden, where the dual-earner family
model has a fairly long history in both countries, Oláh (2003) found that improved public
childcare and parental leave accelerate the transition to the second child. In Japan and
South Korea, where the educational expansion and increase in women’s education
attainment are more rapid than in the West while the patriarchal tradition remains
unchanged, there has been a long period of ultra-low fertility (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon
2010; T. Anderson and Kohler 2015).
Reversal of the gender gap in education
The changing demographic realities, aside from the transition of women’s
economic role from housekeepers or secondary workers to active participants, also
contribute to the evolving gender-role ideology. Traditionally, women tend to marry men
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who are as highly educated as themselves (educational homogamy) or more educated
(educational hypergamy), in accordance with male dominance in education. With the
global trend of the reversal of the gender gap in education, the proportion of hypogamy
(wives having more education than husbands) also increases, suggesting that marriage
patterns adapt to the changing demographic and marriage market realities (Esteve et al.
2016). Based on data collected in 2009 and 2010 from divorced Belgian men and women,
Theunis et al. (2015) argued that divorced men are more likely to get married to highlyeducated women. This post-divorce (assortative) re-partnering is closely related to the
growing number of potential highly-educated female mates in the marriage market, which
is in accordance with the reversal of the gender gap in educational attainment.
This adaptation has important implications for gender egalitarian attitudes and
family outcomes (Van Bavel 2012). First, compared with traditional assortative marriage
(hypergamy), the instability of hypogamous marriage has declined. Using data from
multiple sources on marriages formed between 1950 and 2004 in the United States,
Schwartz and Han (2014) suggested that the importance of relative education between
husband and wife for marriage outcomes has diminished over time. Specifically, the
once-observed association between women’s higher education than their husbands and
higher chances of divorce has declined remarkably. Instead, these couples no longer show
higher probability of divorce in recent marriage cohorts, and homogamous couples have
become less likely to divorce than hypergamous couples. The convergence in the risks of
marital dissolution of hypogamous and hypergamous marriage is also found in twelve
European countries (Grow, Schnor, and Van Bavel 2017). The association between
wives’ earnings advantage and marital dissolution also weakened between 1968 and 2009
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according to a study using data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the United
States (Schwartz and Gonalons-Pons 2016).
Second, contrary to classical depictions of lower fertility in highly-educated
groups because of higher opportunity costs of having children, a growing number of
studies support that highly-educated groups are less likely to have a motherhood penalty
(D. J. Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003; Budig and Hodges 2014) and more likely to
progress to higher parities. Using data covering 18 European countries, Nitsche et al.
(2015) argue that though highly-educated homogamous couples display later entry into
parenthood, they have the highest progression rates to second and third births in most
countries. One study on longitudinal data from Sweden also shows that most educated
homogamous couples have the lowest risk of divorce and higher chance of having
another child (Dribe and Stanfors 2010).
One of the explanations is that households with two highly-educated spouses have
greater economic production and future stability to have another child. Second, high
educational attainment is associated with more egalitarian gender-role attitudes such that
male partners might be more supportive of female labor force participation and willing to
take part of the housework. Moreover, highly-educated women may have more
bargaining power either for more domestic household tasks taken on by their husbands or
for market solutions such as paying for nannies or cleaners.
Chinese Context and Hypotheses
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, gender equity has
been zealously advocated. Government intervention has largely affected the process of
Chinese women’s status improvement. First, the Chinese constitution guarantees women
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equal rights with men in all spheres of life (Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, and Zhang 1999) and
gender equality is also a basic state policy (ji ben guo ce) for China, demonstrated by the
slogan of ‘women can hold up half the sky’. Second, the birth control policies that have
been implemented in China for more than three decades (Gu et al. 2007) have largely
sped up the demographic transition (Feeney and Wang 1993) and also played a strong
role in changing women’s status. The fast declining fertility reduces women’s time
commitment to family obligations and improves women’s status (Wu, Ye, and He 2014).
Research has also shown that fertility decline has increased family investment in
children’s education (Qin, Zhuang, and Yang 2017) and reduced educational gender
inequality (Wu and Zhang 2010; Lu and Zhang 2016).
However, during the market transition, the more gender-egalitarian state sectors
have gradually retreated and many publicly-subsidized childcare centers have stopped
providing services (Cook and Dong 2011). China’s deeper integration into the world
economy after joining the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 2001 has also led to
greater exposure to Western attitudes, ideals, values and lifestyles. The state-dominant
Marxist political discourse has gradually shifted to a market-oriented discourse that
emphasizes distinct abilities deriving from essential gender differences (Sun and Chen
2015). Some recent studies suggest that the traditional gender ideology largely remains
intact even under state socialism (Zuo 2012; Ji et al. 2017) and women still take the main
responsibility for household chores and raising children. Empirical studies also find that
women, especially mothers, are increasingly in an unfavorable position in the labor
market (L. Zhang, Brauw, and Rozelle 2004; Yuping Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008;
Y. Zhang and Hannum 2015). Given the increasing competition in the labor market
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during the market transition, highly-educated women, who are more likely to hold
egalitarian gender ideology, will face higher opportunity costs of having children. In
other East Asian societies, such as Japan and the ‘Asian Tigers’ (Hong Kong, Taiwan,
South Korea, and Singapore), unequal gender relations in the private sphere and the child
quantity-quality trade-off with increasing educational expectations for children have been
considered the main driving forces for the very low fertility (Frejka, Jones, and Sardon
2010). An empirical analysis on 2012 data from Hong Kong also suggests that, for
women who have had two children, the intention for a third child is negatively correlated
with unequal division of housework (M. Chen and Yip 2017, 2017). Also, with the
persisting universal, early marriage in China and the recent resurgence of patriarchal
Confucian traditions, women who are not yet married by their late 20s are castigated as
‘leftover’ women. These women are usually highly-educated, experiencing the clash
between the egalitarian gender ideology that they were brought up with and the
resurgence of traditional gender-role ideology (Ji 2015). According to the gender equity
theory of fertility change (McDonald 2000; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård
2015), this conflict reflects the first stage of the ‘gender revolution’ that women have
pioneered toward gender egalitarianism, while men have not joined women in the private
sphere of the family, leading to lower fertility intentions. Thus, we develop the first
hypothesis that corresponds to the fertility decline in classical demographic transition
theory:
H1: women with more egalitarian gender-role ideology tend to
have lower fertility intentions.
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Nevertheless, the intense socioeconomic transformations that have occurred in
China within a much shorter period than other societies might provide a more
complicated story rather than a simple monotonic relationship depicted by this hypothesis.
Because of the policy - ‘Let some people get rich first’ - implemented during the
economic reforms since the 1980s, there have been growing regional disparities and
rural-urban gaps in developmental levels in China (Xie and Zhou 2014). Coastal areas are
the first to enjoy rapid economic development and some places have reached the same
level of many developed countries in the world. People in these areas also have greater
exposure to Western attitudes, values, and lifestyles. Cohabitation, which used to be
unacceptable, is found to be more prevalent in the highly-educated group and in more
developed coastal regions (Raymo et al. 2015), and some studies suggest that a sexual
revolution may well be underway in most cosmopolitan cities of China (Farrer 2014).
Thus, the relationship between fertility and more gender equal attitudes (or higher
educational attainment) in these areas might be akin to the observations in more
developed societies and show a reverse trend.
Further, with rapid educational expansion, the gender gap in education has also
been minimized, especially in urban China. As depicted in Figure 3-1, the sex ratio of
urban residents having at least vocational college education has been around 1 for urban
residents born after 1980, and there is a tendency of reversal (more highly-educated
women than men) in cities. More educated women tend to hold more egalitarian gender
ideology and have preferences for men with egalitarian norms, common interests, and
similar career views, who are also more likely to be more educated. In the United States,
shortly after the reversal of the gender gap in education, wives’ education started to
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exceed husbands’ in early 1990s (Schwartz and Han 2014). Thus, we expect to see an
increase in educational hypogamy and homogamy in highly-educated groups across
cohorts, which is supported by our analysis shown later. This trend, as suggested by
previous studies on Western societies, might lead to a higher level of gender equity
within the household, which could, in turn, lead to more stable marriages and higher
progression rates to second birth. Moreover, the propaganda of gender equity during
school education may not only affect women’s perceptions about gender roles, but also
drive the gender-role ideology of more educated men. Because of their longer exposure to
gender equity propaganda and women’s competence in studying, more educated men
may have more egalitarian attitudes. Thus, the second stage of the ‘gender revolution’
that involves men (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015) might have also been
achieved for this subgroup of people.
FIGURE 3-1 ABOUT HERE
However, in less developed places, the traditional gender relations and gender gap
in education persist. As shown in Figure 3-1, the gender gap in high educational
attainment remains for rural residents. The sex ratio for people with vocational college or
above education drops to around 1 only for the very young cohorts. This persisting
gender gap in education is partly because rural places lag behind urban areas in
educational expansion. It may also partly result from the fact that in the less developed
rural areas, traditional patriarchal norms and discrimination against girls are still
prevalent. This can also be reflected by the abnormally high sex ratio at birth (SRB, ratio
of male births to female births) even in recent years. SRB is recorded around 1.16 during
the period between 2010 and 2015 (UNPD 2015), much higher than the range of 1.03 to
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1.07 without sex-selective interventions. Thus, the gender-role attitude in rural places is
less egalitarian, and fertility intentions might also be higher for this traditional group.
Further, the dating market for highly-educated groups is much smaller in rural
areas than in urban places, implying that the increase in homogamous marriage of highlyeducated people might be so small that the traditional gender ideology is less likely to be
affected. According to the 2010 census, for the birth cohorts between 1981 and 1985,
people with education at the level of vocational college or above in rural places are only
one-eighth of the number in urban areas, while the ratio is three-fourths for the total
population in these cohorts. This is not only because of the slower educational expansion,
but also because rural residents with high educational attainment tend to move to cities.
Thus, for rural subgroups, women with more egalitarian gender ideology are more likely
to feel the unfairness in the gender system within household, which is still dominated by
traditional gender relations.
Based on the great heterogeneity across regions and subgroups, we propose the
second hypothesis incorporating the fertility change in post-demographic transition
population. That is, the relationship between egalitarian gender ideology and fertility
intentions might be curvilinear:
H2: women with more and less egalitarian gender-role ideology
tend to have higher fertility intentions than those with average gender
equality attitudes.
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Data and Analytical Approach
Data
In this chapter, we pool nationally-representative samples from the Chinese
General Social Surveys (CGSS) conducted in 2010, 2012 and 2013. The CGSS is a
repeated cross-sectional survey initially launched in 2003 by Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology and Renmin University of China. The first phase of CGSS
included five waves of surveys conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008 (Bian and
Li 2012). The second phase, which started in 2010, adopted a multi-stage, stratified,
random sampling design based on updated demographic and socioeconomic information.
The most developed cities, including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and
Tianjin, are in one strata with city subdistricts (jie dao) as primary sampling units (PSU).
All the other places are in another stratum, including both urban and rural areas, with
counties (xian) or city districts (qu) as PSUs. Targeted respondents are civilian adults,
ages eighteen or older. The second-phase CGSS data are ideal for this chapter because
the surveys collected information on respondents’ current marital status and fertility
intentions, along with other sociodemographic characteristics for both respondents and
their partners. Because the 2011 survey did not ask about respondents’ fertility intentions
or gender-role attitudes, we only use three waves of data (collected in 2010, 2012 and
2013) in our analysis.
For the descriptive part about gender-role attitudes across cohorts, educational
attainment, and educational assortative marriage, we restrict the analysis to married
women between ages 20 and 49. When both urban and rural samples are included, we
have 7,891 observations in our analysis. For the test of the hypotheses about the
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relationship between gender-role attitudes and higher fertility intentions, we further
restrict the analysis to women who have only one child for several reasons. First, because
we focus on the intention of having two or more children (as explained later), it is more
likely for women with only one child to express their intentions, compared to childless
women or women with two or more children. 30 Second, all families are allowed to have
at least two children after the relaxation of birth control, so analyzing the fertility
intention of women who have one child can contribute more to the discussion about the
impact of relaxed policies. Thus, we finally obtain an analytical sample with 4,313
observations. 31
Measurement of Gender-Role Ideology
To test the hypotheses, we use structural equation modeling with four indicators
measuring women’s gender-role ideology as a latent variable. By using latent variables,
we can partly correct the bias caused by the measurement error in independent indicators
of gender-role attitudes. The indicators are measured by Likert scales with five levels of
rating - strongly disagree, to some extent disagree, neutral, to some extent agree, strongly
agree.32 The first indicator is ‘men should be career-oriented (yi shi ye wei zhong) while
women should be family oriented (yi jia ting wei zhong)’, which can be treated as an
indicator of agreement on the traditional breadwinner-housekeeper model in our analysis.
The second indicator is ‘men are born to have an advantage over women (nan ren tian
sheng bi nv ren qiang)’. The third indicator is ‘getting married to a better man is more
30

Childless women might change their intentions once they enter into motherhood. For women who already have two
or more children, their answer will suffer from post hoc rationalization.
31
The total sample size is 4391. After list-wise deletion of observations with missing values on variables other than
household income, the sample size is 4313. Missing on household income (about 9.6%) is dealt with using full
information maximum likelihood (FIML), based on the assumption of multivariate normality. Monte Carlo integration
with 500 integration points is used. The descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix Table 3-1.
32
The Pearson correlations between all pairs of indicators are shown in Appendix Table 3-2.
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important than succeeding in career (gan de hao bu ru jia de hao)’. The last indicator is
‘female employees should leave the labor market first (xian jie gu nv yuan gong) during
economic recessions’.
A body of literature takes the exact time or self-assessed frequency of doing
housework chores or childcare as proxies for power or gender equity. Based on analysis
of working women in Italy, where gender asymmetry in organization of time and family
tasks persists, Mencarini and Tanturri (2004) maintain that husbands’ frequent
involvement in everyday childcare for the first child has significant positive effects on
women’s probability of having a second child. Capitalizing on data from the National
Survey of Families and Households, the analysis results suggest that dual-earner couples
in the United States are more likely to have a second child when wives’ share of
household work is less than 54 percent and more than 84 percent (Torr and Short 2004).
Though division of household chores can partly reflect gender ideology; some factors
might undermine this connection. On the one hand, the domestic division of labor might
be a crude indicator of egalitarian gender ideology in that it is also affected by other
factors, such as the availability of societal supports, the price of market solutions, and the
type and quantity of household work (Gregson and Lowe 1994). According to analyses
on Italian and Dutch samples, Mills et al. (2008) suggested that only when the workload
is heavy would an unequal division of household labor impact women’s fertility
intentions. On the other hand, gender-role ideology might affect the interactive mode or
decision-making rather than housework division (Hardill et al. 1997). Aiming for ‘equity’
also goes far beyond simple equal-opportunity concepts or equality of outcome, such as
equal time spent for household chores (McDonald 2013). Husbands with gender
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egalitarian ideology might understand more about wives’ difficulties in balancing family
and work, show more respect, and compromise. Further, the relationship between
housework division and fertility intentions may not be understood by examining only
current behavior. Rather, we need to also anticipate decision-making based on future
expected outcomes, which might be more determined by shared values or attitudes, such
as gender-role ideology, if the couples discuss and agree on childbearing plans.
Thus, we propose that measuring gender-role ideology by attitude indicators
rather than using housework division33 can better enrich the empirical analysis about
gender equity theory in relation to fertility and predict childbearing behaviors. In this
chapter, after transforming all four indicators, higher scores (ranging from 0 to 4)
represent higher levels of egalitarian gender ideology. All the indicators are treated as
continuous in the measurement model.
Method
A model with multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC) is estimated 34 in
Mplus 7 with gender-role ideology as the latent variable (Figure 3-2). The latent variable
in a MIMIC model has effect indicators and can be regressed on cause indicators
(predictors). However, this approach assumes measurement invariance across the groups
(Kline 2010).
FIGURE 3-2 ABOUT HERE
The predictors include educational attainment of both women and their husbands,
while the interactive terms between women’s and their husbands’ educational levels are

33
34

Due to data availability, we cannot conduct analysis by using housework division.
Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors is used.
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not included because of consistent estimates in the structural model and trivial
improvement of the model fit (see model fit statistics in Appendix Table 3-3). Education
encompasses both economic and cultural aspects, and serves as an important factor in
mate selection. It has also long been treated as a marker for gender ideology, specifically
that higher educational attainment is associated with a more egalitarian gender-role
attitude. Educational levels are classified into four groups: primary school or lower,
middle school, high school and college (including vocational college, da zhuan) or above.
Birth cohort groups with three categories (born between 1961 and 1970 as the reference
group, between 1971 and 1980, between 1981 and 1993) are also included in the model
because younger cohorts have more exposure to Western values and tend to be more
‘modern’ in terms of gender ideology. A place of residence variable (urban areas as
reference category, rural areas) is included in the MIMIC model, because, according to
the literature, it relates to the differences in both socioeconomic development and genderrole ideology between rural and urban China.
To test our hypotheses, we take respondents’ answers to the question ‘how many
children do you want to have if without birth control policies?’ as the dependent variable.
The answers are dichotomized into two categories: none or one child, two or more
children.35 Overall, for women who have one child, about 61 percent want to have two or
more children if without policy constraints. Because we have a binary outcome for the
dependent variable, logistic regression model is used to test our hypotheses.

35

Less than one percent of the respondents want to be childless, so they are categorized into one group with those who
want only one child. About three percent of the respondents want to have more than two children, so they are
categorized into one group with those who want two children.
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Other individual attributes are also controlled in the analysis, including women’s
age and hukou status (agricultural hukou, reference group is other hukou types) of both
women and their husbands. The sex of the first child (a son, reference group is having a
daughter) is also included in the model because of the potential son preference that
another child might be more wanted if the first child is a girl. Women’s working status
(not working for paid work as the reference group) is also included and the logarithm of
household income during the year before the survey is used as a proxy for economic
condition. We also include whether living together with mother or mother in-law, and
whether living together with father or father in-law into the model, to control for the
potential childcare support provided by other family members. After including
community-level measures (average community level household income and years of
education), we also include dummy variables for survey year (year 2010 as the reference
year) and economic macro-regions (east region as the reference group, middle region and
west region). Models are specified with clustering at city subdistricts (jie dao) and
villages (xiang/zhen)36 to correct the standard errors.
Results
Educational Expansion and Assortative Marriage
Figure 3-3 depicts the increase of married women’s educational attainment across
birth cohorts. For urban residents, the proportion of women receiving college education
grows from about 18 percent for 1961-1970 cohort group to about 40 percent for 1981-

36

As explained, to account for the heterogeneity in the most developed cities, the PSU for the most developed cities
(city subdistricts) differ from other places (counties or city districts). However, because city subdistricts (jie dao) and
villages (xiang/zhen) belong to the same administrative level in China, we treat them as the clustering variable. In
administrative system in China, one county (xian) can have several villages (xiang/zhen).
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1993 cohort group,37 while the proportions of all the other groups drop. For rural people,
the biggest increase is in the proportion of women with middle school education with a
rapid decrease in proportion of women with least education. Previous studies indicate that
education encompasses both value and economic aspects. As summarized in Table 3-1,
for both urban sample and rural samples, there is a clear educational gradient that women
with higher educational attainment tend to have higher level of egalitarian gender
ideology across all the indicators. The gradient is sharper for rural women, probably
because highly-educated women are more selected in rural area with much smaller
proportion than in urban area. If we compare values of the indicators by women’s
husbands’ educational attainment, the gradient still remains. That is, women with more
educated husbands tend to have more egalitarian gender-role ideology.
FIGURE 3-3 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 3-1 ABOUT HERE
The evolving demographic realities also affect assortative marriage, especially for
urban residents. As illustrated in Figure 3-4 for married women, in urban areas, the
proportion of homogamy in the most educated group grew from 13 percent in the 19611970 cohorts to more than 30 percent in 1981-1993 cohorts. Given that some highlyeducated people will get married at older ages, the proportion of homogamy among the
most educated group might still increase for the youngest cohort group. Instead, the
proportion of hypergamous marriage dropped from around 30 percent to less than 20
percent. For the rural sample, the biggest increase is homogamy among those with middle
37

The proportion of receiving college education for this cohort group should be higher because later cohorts might not
have finished their college when the survey was conducted.
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school education, while the proportions of both homogamy among the least educated and
hypergamous marriage dropped.38
FIGURE 3-4 ABOUT HERE
Gender-Role Ideology and Fertility Intentions
As discussed, the changing demographic realities in the gender gap in education
and assortative mating have important implications for gender-role ideology and family
outcomes.
For women who have one child, we further test the classical demographic
transition hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) versus the hypothesis incorporating postdemographic transition (Hypothesis 2) regarding the relationship between the level of
egalitarian gender ideology and higher fertility intentions. We first fit the MIMIC model
with gender ideology as the latent variable. The predictors include the educational
attainment of both wife and husband, women’s birth cohort groups, and rural/urban
difference. As shown in Table 3-2, higher educational attainment is associated with more
egalitarian gender-role ideology. Younger birth cohort group tends to have more modern
gender-role attitudes. The variable of rural area is not statistically significant because it is
highly correlated with the educational attainment of women and their husband. 39 Fit
statistics suggest that this model fits the data well (Table 3-3). Specifically, both the
lower and upper bounds of 90% confidence interval for RMSEA is less than 0.05 and

38

Mean values of indicators for different assortative mating patterns are also shown in Appendix Table 3-4. For
homogamous marriage, the gradient is clear that more educated ones tend to hold more egalitarian gender-role ideology.
The mean values of educational hypogamy fall between middle school homogamous marriage and high school
homogamous marriage, while the mean values of hypergamous marriage are only higher than homogamous marriage
with primary school or lower.
39
If we exclude the variables of educational attainment, the estimate of variable of rural area is -0.480 and is significant
at 0.001 level (S.E.=0.049).
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both approximate fit indexes (GFI and CFI) are favorable. The result for SRMR is 0.014,
indicating acceptable overall model fit.40
TABLE 3-2 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 3-3 ABOUT HERE
We further add the structural part of the logistic regression predicting higher
fertility intentions.41 To test our hypotheses, we compare the results between the models
without (Model I) and with (Model II) the quadratic term of latent variable (gender-role
ideology).42 As summarized in Table 3-4, gender-role ideology has no statistically
significant effect on women’s fertility intentions in Model I. However, the quadratic term
of the latent variable in Model II is significant at 0.05 level. Thus, there is some, though
not very strong, evidence for a curvilinear relationship between the level of egalitarian
gender ideology and higher fertility intentions. Specifically, the lowest level of fertility
intention is achieved when the value of latent variable is around 0.531. Thus, for the 35
percent43 of the observations with higher levels of egalitarian gender ideology, there is a
positive association between fertility intentions and egalitarian gender ideology. For the
other 65 percent of the observations, the association between fertility intentions and
egalitarian gender ideology is negative. Both models indicate that the fertility intention
for a second child is higher with higher household income, which is legitimate because
40

The chi-square test statistic rejects the MIMIC model, but it is sensitive to samples larger than 200, as in our study,
and will tend to reject the model even when the fit is adequate.
41
Current model assumes that the gender-role ideology fully mediates the effects the impacts of the predictors in
MIMIC model. We also include the predictors in the MIMIC model in the logistic model. However, only the dummy
variables of least education of women and most education of men are significant, with the variable of household
income being no longer significant. The BIC suggests that current model (BIC=27201) is much better than the logistic
model with predictors (BIC=27251).
42
The quadratic term is generated by using XWITH command in Mplus.
43
We generate and check the distribution of the predicted latent variable (gender-role ideology) from the MIMIC model.
About 35% (1,493 observations) have estimates of the predicted latent variable bigger than 0.531. The mean value of
the predicted latent variable is around 0.265.
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families with more economic resources are more likely to afford to a second child. Living
with mother or mother in-law have only marginal positive effects on women’s fertility
intention.
TABLE 3-4 ABOUT HERE
We then conduct analysis on rural and urban samples, respectively (Table 3-5).
The negative impact of egalitarian gender-role ideology for the rural sample supports our
speculation in the literature review. That is, in less developed areas, women with more
egalitarian gender ideology are more likely to feel the unfairness in the gender system
within household and show lower fertility intentions. For the urban sample, there is no
significant monotonic or curvilinear relationship found between gender-role ideology and
fertility intentions, however, the estimate of the effect of egalitarian gender-role ideology
is positive. No significant non-linear relationship is found for either model.
TABLE 3-5 ABOUT HERE
In sum, the model tests support our second hypothesis that suggests a U-shape
relationship between egalitarian gender ideology and fertility intentions versus the first
classical demographic transition hypothesis depicting a negative relationship. However,
for the rural subgroup, the negative relationship is more prevalent.
Conclusion and Discussion
Previous studies suggest that the evolution of the marriage institution in China is
distinct from that of Western societies (Yeung and Hu 2016). This chapter further points
to the modern-traditional mosaic that contributes to the curvilinear relationship between
different levels of egalitarian gender ideology and fertility intentions among Chinese
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women. Specifically, based on the Chinese context, we use data from a nationallyrepresentative survey to test the classical demographic transition hypothesis versus the
hypothesis developed from gender equity theory about fertility. We find some evidence
of a U-shape relationship between the level of egalitarian gender equity and women’s
fertility intentions for a second child in contemporary China, which has been buffeted by
tremendous social changes. That is, women with more and less egalitarian gender
ideology tend to have higher fertility intentions than those with average gender equality
attitudes.
This non-linear relationship lies in the profound social changes and economic
transitions ongoing in contemporary China. Specifically, the once prevalent egalitarian
gender ideology has been in a clash with the deteriorating positions of women in the
labor market. After the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Communist
ideology regarding gender equality was once zealously promoted. In accordance with
Marx and Engels’ doctrine that women’s emancipation is contingent on their
participation in social production, Chinese women were encouraged by the state to join
the labor market (Croll 1983). Moreover, the considerable increase in female educational
attainment (Lavely et al. 1990) enhances women’s economic status, and Chinese girls’
educational opportunities were found to be more responsive than boys’ to better
household economic circumstances (Hannum 2005). The ethos of egalitarianism have
been further interiorized by the state propaganda permeated with the image of the ‘Iron
Girls’ (Honig 2000). However, the recent erosion of women’s economic position relative
to men’s points to the fact that women’s position in the labor market has deteriorated
(Zhang et al. 2004; Wang 2005; Li and Li 2008). Women’s perceptions of discrimination
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also rise after market reforms (Parish and Busse 2000). These shifts occurred at different
rates for different segments of the population, behooving us to try to examine its
implications for Chinese’ women’s fertility intentions.
Facing a continuously changing milieu, girls continue to rival or outperform boys
in educational performance and engagement (Hannum, Kong, and Zhang 2009). This
trend brings China, especially urban areas, in line with the global trend of the reversal in
gender gap in education. This changing demographic reality induces the adaption of the
assortative marriage that the traditional hypergamy drops in tandem with a growth in
proportion of homogamous couples. In urban China, there is a remarkable increase of
homogamous marriage among the highly-educated group, paving the way for the second
stage in ‘gender revolution’. The legacies from the once prevalent egalitarian gender
ideology has also brought highly-educated men into the ‘gender revolution’. Thus, for
these subgroups, the gender equity within household might reach to a higher level,
reducing wives’ strain between the role of a caring parent and that of a job-holder.
However, for the rest of the population, women’s perception of unfairness in the gender
system rises with more gender equal attitudes because their partners’ gender ideology has
not yet transmitted to an egalitarian one.
As emphasized by McDonald (2013), ‘(women’s) perceptions of unfairness arise
because individually oriented institutions such as education and market opportunities
open up new opportunities for women…Having no or few children is a reaction on the
part of women to perceived unfairness in the gender system of the cultural context in
which they live’. Our analysis suggests a curvilinear relationship between egalitarian
gender ideology and fertility intentions in China. This might result from different life105

course experiences and perceptions of unfairness for different subgroups of people in the
context of a mosaic temporality, where the socialist heritage, the resurgence of
Confucianism, both of the socialist version and capitalist version of modernity interact (Ji
2017). In the era of universal two-child policy, our results also have policy implications
for future fertility trends in China. As pointed out in other studies (Attané 2016b), the
lack of state policies supporting families and women’s deteriorated positions in the labor
market, rather than the state birth controls, might exert growing influence on Chinese
fertility decisions. With the socioeconomic development underway, childbearing
decisions of people with lower socioeconomic status (also with less egalitarian gender
ideology), who now have high fertility intentions, will be increasingly affected by
motherhood penalties as women are more educated and join modern economic
production. Women’s perception of unfairness might negatively affect their childbearing
behavior if without transitions to egalitarian gender ideology within household. Thus, the
gender equity should be promoted in related public policies, such as labor market
regulations minimizing gender discriminations and parental leave policies balancing
childcaring responsibility between men and women (M. Zhao 2016).
There are several limitations of this chapter. First, we do not have information
about actual behaviors related to gender equity, such as division of household chores and
the market solutions adopted to reduce the role incompatibility, to compare the results
with previous studies. Second, our analyses do not incorporate women’s perceptions
about gender inequality in the private sphere and in public spheres, which might better
connect to the gender equity theory of fertility (McDonald 2013).
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Tables and Figures
Table 3-1 Mean values of women’s gender-role ideology indicators across subgroups
Urban sample

Indicator 1

Indicator 2

Indicator 3

Indicator 4

Primary school or lower

1.13

1.64

1.54

2.73

Middle school

1.53

2.13

1.86

3.10

High school

1.86

2.42

2.03

3.24

College or above

2.15

2.58

2.12

3.37

Primary school or lower

1.25

1.78

1.64

2.83

Middle school

1.48

2.06

1.81

3.04

High school

1.82

2.35

1.98

3.21

College or above

2.05

2.53

2.10

3.32

Primary school or lower

0.96

1.57

1.53

2.70

Middle school

1.39

2.06

1.78

2.97

High school

1.91

2.57

2.16

3.21

College or above

2.29

2.84

2.50

3.29

Primary school or lower

1.06

1.64

1.54

2.74

Middle school

1.26

1.90

1.72

2.89

High school

1.36

2.11

1.90

2.95

College or above

2.13

2.85

2.25

3.26

Women’s educational level

Husbands’ educational level

Rural sample
Women’s educational level

Husbands’ educational level

Note: All indicators are measured by Likert scale ranging from 0 to 4. All the scales have been
transformed, such that higher scores indicate higher level of egalitarian gender ideology.
Indicator 1: men should be career-oriented while women should be family oriented.
Indicator 2: men are born to have an advantage over women.
Indicator 3: getting married to a better man is more important than succeeding in career.
Indicator 4: female employees should leave the labor market first during economic recessions.
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Table 3-2 Factor loadings and structural coefficients in MIMIC model
Estimate

S.E.

Factor loadings on gender-role ideology (the intercept
is fixed at 0 and the residual variance is fixed at 1)
Indicator 1

0.732***

0.020

Indicator 2

0.815***

0.022

Indicator 3

0.541***

0.022

Indicator 4

0.352***

0.017

-0.559***

0.064

0.298***

0.059

***

0.084

Structural coefficients
Educational level of women (ref: middle school)
Primary school or lower
High school
College or above

0.481

Educational level of husbands (ref: middle school)
-0.114+

Primary school or lower

0.170**

High school
College or above

0.140

+

0.067
0.055
0.073

Birth cohort groups (ref: 1961-1970)
1971-1980

0.157***

0.045

1981-1993

0.200***

0.052

Rural area (ref: urban area)

-0.050

Number of observations

0.053

4313

Note: Standard errors are estimated by clustering at city subdistricts (jie dao) and villages
(xiang/zhen); + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3-3 Results of fit statistics for MIMIC model
Fit statistics

Result

Chi-square

126.231

Degrees of freedom

29

P-Value

0.000
0.028 (0.023 – 0.033)

RMSEA (90% CI)
CFI

0.963

TLI

0.947

SRMR

0.014

109

Table 3-4 Factor loadings and structural coefficients
Model I
Model II
Gender-role ideology (the intercept is fixed at 0 and the residual variance is fixed at 1)
Indicator 1
0.732***
0.732***
Indicator 2
0.815***
0.815***
***
Indicator 3
0.542
0.541***
***
Indicator 4
0.352
0.352***
Structural coefficients
Educational level of women (ref: middle school)
Primary school or lower
-0.557***
-0.559***
High school
0.300***
0.298***
***
College or above
0.482
0.481***
Educational level of husband (ref: middle school)
Primary school or lower
-0.112+
-0.111
High school
0.171*
0.173*
+
College or above
0.141
0.143+
Birth cohort groups (ref: 1961-1970)
1971-1980
0.159**
0.160**
***
1981-1993
0.202
0.202***
Rural area (ref: urban area)
-0.048
-0.050
Coefficients of logistic regression of intention for two or
more children (ref: preferring one child or being childless)
Gender-role ideology
-0.036
-0.068
Gender-role ideology2
0.064*
Age
-0.006
-0.007
Agricultural hukou (ref: other hukou types)
0.151
0.151
Agricultural hukou of husband (ref: other hukou types)
-0.059
-0.062
Working (ref: not working)
0.066
0.067
Having a son (ref: having a daughter)
0.014
0.014
Logarithm of household income (centered)
0.124**
0.121**
+
Co-resident with mother or mother in-law
0.177
0.180+
Co-resident with father or father in-law
-0.033
-0.031
Community-level characteristics
Years of education
0.019
0.022
Logarithm of household income
-0.087
-0.085
Year (ref: 2010)
2012
0.209*
0.217*
2013
0.031
0.039
Region (ref: East)
Middle
-0.233*
-0.233*
West
-0.049
-0.060
Number of free parameters
39
40
Loglikelihood
-33437
-33435
Number of observations
4313
4313
Note: Missing data on household income are dealt with using full information maximum
likelihood (FIML). Standard errors are estimated by clustering at city subdistricts (jie dao) and
villages (xiang/zhen).+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3-5 Factor loadings and structural coefficients for rural and urban samples
Rural
Urban
sample
sample
Gender-role ideology (the intercept is fixed at 0 and the residual variance is fixed at 1)
Indicator 1
0.666***
0.733***
***
Indicator 2
0.811
0.835***
***
Indicator 3
0.602
0.536***
***
Indicator 4
0.357
0.335***
Structural coefficients
Educational level of women (ref: middle school)
Primary school or lower
-0.468***
-0.594***
***
High school
0.561
0.245***
*
College or above
0.495
0.455***
Educational level of husband (ref: middle school)
Primary school or lower
-0.103
-0.104
High school
0.224+
0.148*
College or above
0.440
0.123
Birth cohort groups (ref: 1961-1970)
1971-1980
0.241**
0.138**
***
1981-1993
0.397
0.111+
Coefficients of logistic regression of intention for two or more
children (ref: preferring one child or being childless)
Gender-role ideology
-0.179*
0.011
Age
-0.002
-0.010
Agricultural hukou (ref: other hukou types)
-0.349
0.222+
Agricultural hukou of husband (ref: other hukou types)
0.065
-0.109
Working (ref: not working)
-0.083
0.091
Having a son (ref: having a daughter)
0.058
0.007
Logarithm of household income (centered)
0.072
0.140*
Co-resident with mother or mother in-law
-0.105
0.294*
Co-resident with father or father in-law
0.187
-0.127
Community-level characteristics
Years of education
-0.022
0.021
Logarithm of household income
-0.170
0.066
Year (ref: 2010)
2012
0.211
0.162
2013
0.278
-0.101
Region (ref: East)
Middle
-0.945***
0.088
West
-0.389*
-0.011
Number of free parameters
38
38
Loglikelihood
-8961
-24236
Number of observations
1170
3143
Note: Missing data on household income are dealt with using full information maximum likelihood
(FIML). Standard errors are estimated by clustering at city subdistricts (jie dao) and villages
(xiang/zhen). + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 3-1 Sex ratio for people with vocational college or above education
by birth cohort between 1961 and 1990

Source: Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China.
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Figure 3-2 Path diagram of MIMIC model with gender-role ideology as the latent
variable

Educational attainment
of women

Educational attainment
of husbands

1

E1

1

E2

1

E3

Indicator 1

1

D
Indicator 2

Gender-role
ideology
Birth cohort groups of
women

Indicator 3

1

Place of residence

E4

Indicator 4

Note: For simplicity, correlations between the independent variables are not shown.
Indicator 1: men should be career-oriented while women should be family oriented.
Indicator 2: men are born to have an advantage over women.
Indicator 3: getting married to a better man is more important than succeeding in career.
Indicator 4: female employees should leave the labor market first during economic recessions.
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Figure 3-3 Educational distribution of women
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Figure 3-4 Distribution of assortative marriage

Note: Hypergamy: marriage in which the wife is less educated than her husband
Homogamy: marriage in which two spouses have the same education level
Hypogamy: marriage in which the wife is more educated than her husband
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Appendix
Appendix Table 3-1 Descriptive statistics of analytical sample
Women with one child
Fertility intention (%)
Preferring one child or being childless
Two or more children
Indicators of gender-role ideology (numeric values from 0 to 4)
Indicator 1
Indicator 2
Indicator 3
Indicator 4
Educational level (%)
Primary school or lower
Middle school
High school
College or above
Educational level of husband (%)
Primary school or lower
Middle school
High school
College or above
Birth cohort (%)
1961-1970
1971-1980
1981-1993
Living places (%)
Urban area
Rural area
Age (mean)
Hukou status (%)
Agricultural
Other hukou types
Hukou status of husband (%)
Agricultural
Other hukou types
Working status of women (%)
Working
Not working
116

38.95
61.05
1.72
2.26
1.93
3.14
16.55
35.96
23.28
24.21
12.36
35.64
25.53
26.48
33.76
40.90
25.34
72.87
27.13
36.96
44.82
55.18
42.31
57.69
72.85
27.15

Sex of first child (%)
Daughter
41.39
Son
58.61
Household income (median/mean)
40000/64368
Co-resident with mother or mother in-law
Yes
20.03
No
79.97
Co-resident with father or father in-law
Yes
15.53
No
84.47
Community-level characteristics
Years of education (mean)
10.03
Household income (median/mean)
45580/61299
Year (%)
2010
36.68
2012
32.60
2013
30.72
Region (%)
East
49.32
Middle
31.32
West
19.36
Number of observations
4,313
Note: About 9.6% of the observations have missing data on household income, thus the mean and
median of household income are summarized based on reported values.
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Appendix Table 3-2 Pearson correlations between all pairs of indicators
Indicator 1

Indicator 2

Indicator 3

Indicator 1

1.000

Indicator 2

0.475

1.000

Indicator 3

0.321

0.354

1.000

Indicator 4

0.219

0.318

0.237

Indicator 4

1.000

Note: The internal consistency reliability can be measured by coefficient
alpha, which is also called Cronbach’s alpha, by using the formula
where n is the number of indicators and is the average
Pearson correlation between all pairs of indicators. Thus, the Cronbach’s
alpha for these four indicators is 0.654, which is adequate for analyses (Kline
2010).
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Appendix Table 3-3 Results of fit statistics for MIMIC model in Table 3-2 with
interactive terms of educational levels
Fit statistics

Result

Chi-square

162.001

Degrees of freedom

56

P-Value

0.000
0.021 (0.017 – 0.025)

RMSEA (90% CI)
CFI

0.964

TLI

0.949

SRMR

0.010

Note: BIC from this model is larger than that of the model reported in Table 3-2, suggesting worse
model fit.
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Appendix Table 3-4 Mean values of women’s gender-role ideology indicators by
assortative mating patterns
Urban sample

Indicator 1

Indicator 2

Indicator 3

Indicator 4

1.84

2.38

2.02

3.22

Primary school or lower

1.07

1.55

1.47

2.69

Middle school

1.48

2.08

1.85

3.08

High school

1.90

2.45

2.01

3.27

College or above

2.14

2.56

2.10

3.36

Educational hypergamy

1.54

2.10

1.84

3.03

1.54

2.14

1.84

3.05

Primary school or lower

0.95

1.53

1.49

2.65

Middle school

1.41

2.05

1.78

2.94

High school

2.01

2.84

2.26

3.29

College or above

2.54

3.14

2.39

3.50

Educational hypergamy

1.07

1.74

1.66

2.83

Educational hypogamy
Educational homogamy

Rural sample
Educational hypogamy
Educational homogamy

Note: Same with Table 3-1.
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